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The Former Client's Disqualification 
Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit 
of an Ethical Anomaly 
Steven H. Goldberg* 
INTRODUCTION 
Disqualification of counsel for conflict of interest was once 
a rare court action used to enforce the Canons of Ethics and to 
protect the image of the profession. It  was of little interest to 
commentators, evoking only an occasional concern for the con- 
flict problems of the former government 1awyer.l The 1953 
landmark successive conflict disqualification decision in T.C. 
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures2 initially received only 
footnote attention in the scholarly j o~ rna l s .~  Two years later 
the seminal imputed disqualification decision in Laslcey Bros. v. 
Warner Bros. Pictures4 escaped notice entirely. As recently as 
1969, the American Bar Association's (ABA) Code of Profes- 
sional Responsibility added little about conflict of interest to its 
1928 Canons of  ethic^.^ 
* Associate Dean, University of Minnesota Law School. I am indebted 
to my colleagues Victor Kramer, John Matheson, and Carol Rieger for their 
encouragement and for their insights and comments on an earlier draft of this 
article. I would also like to thank Cathy Hoffman, class of 1987, University of 
Minnesota Law School, for her valuable assistance. 
1. See Davis, The Federal Conflict of Interest Laws, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
893, 908-11 (1954); Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the 
Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957); McElwain & 
Vorenberg, The Federal Conflict of Interest Statutes, 65 HARV. L. REV. 955, 
970-74 (1952). 
2. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
3. See, e.g., Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests 
Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 917 n.1, passim (1955) (in re- 
sponse to Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp. 
( In  re Proceedings to Disqualify Nickerson), 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954)). 
4. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956). 
5. The 1969 Code deleted the Canons' reference to former clients and 
mentioned the former government lawyer only in disciplinary rules attached 
to a Canon entitled "Avoiding Even the Appearance of Professional Impropri- 
ety!' See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1969). Disciplinary 
Rule 9-101(B) provided: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a 
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By 1984, however, the conflict of interest disqualification 
motion was infamous. The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia deplored "[tlhe tactical use of motions to disqualify 
counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing 
party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the op- 
p ~ n e n t . " ~  The tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in re- 
cent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic 
~ommentary."~ The United States Supreme Court did not quar- 
rel with the court of appeals' characterization of lawyer dis- 
qualification motions as a "dangerous garne."s 
The fifteen-year journey from ethical equanimity to proce- 
dural pandemonium did not travel a path of new law. It  ran on 
a roadway of new reality. The number of lawyers in the United 
States nearly doubled from 355,000 in 1969 to 649,000 in 1984.9 
The number and size of large law firms grew exponentially.1° 
Mergers, split-offs, and lateral moves by lawyers between firms 
have become so common that the prominent lawyer news- 
papers reserve a column for weekly reports of the most note- 
worthy rearrangements.ll 
The traditional conflict of interest rule, prohibiting repre- 
sentation of adverse interests in the same matter, caused occa- 
sional and inadvertent difficulty for the newly mobile lawyers 
and the megafirms they joined and left.12 The real problem, 
matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public em- 
ployee." Id. DR 9-101(B). 
6. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038,1051 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (order disqualifying coun- 
sel in a civil case not a collateral order subject to immediate appeal as a final 
judgment). 
7. Koller, 737 F.2d at 1051. 
8. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985) (quoting 
Koller, 737 F.2d at 1051). 
9. Curran, American Lawyers i n  the 1980s: A Profession i n  Transition, 
20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 19, 20 (1986). 
10. In his 1978 article, Cantor demonstrates a portion of the growth and 
marvels at the ability of firms to grow past the 200-lawyer size. See Cantor, 
Law Firms are Getting Bigger. . . and More Complex, 64 A.B.A. J. 215 (1978). 
The growth in the decade following Cantor's article, as chronicled each fall in 
the National Law Journal, makes 200-lawyer firms common and at best only 
modestly large. In 1986 the largest firm, Baker & McKenzie, had 808 lawyers 
in 31 cities throughout the world. See The N U  250, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, 
a t  S-4. Ninety firms had more than 200 lawyers. Id. 
11. Eg., Lateral Moves, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 2 (regular feature 
column). 
12. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 
1318 (7th Cir.) (disqualification of large multi-city firm in antitrust suit), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). 
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however, was the successive conflict time bomb planted in T,C 
Theatre and triggered by the imputed disqualification approved 
in Laskey. The T.C. Theatre restriction on a lawyer working 
against a former client in a substantially related matter, cou- 
pled with application of that disqualification to all other law- 
yers in the firm as mandated by Laskey, created a formidable 
weapon for the dangerous game of lawyer disqualification in a 
world of large firms and mobile lawyers. 
The successive conflict and imputed disqualification 
problems have not gone unnoticed--only unsolved. Courts 
have reinterpreted the original doctrines, trying to make them 
work in a new, more complex world. Commentators have 
manipulated and explained the rules attempting to balance the 
perceived competing policy and doctrinal interests.13 In 1983, 
13. Recent commentary has focused as much on successive conflict as al- 
most any ethics topic. Despite the plethora of articles, however, no one has 
challenged the bases for the two decisions, T.C. Theatre and Laskey, that sup- 
port the successive conflict rule. Except for articles concerned with federal 
conflict of  interest, see supra note 1, the first consideration of  successive con- 
flict was a 1955 student note in the Yale Law Journal. See Note, supra note 3. 
With the exception of another Yale student piece a decade later, see Note, Un- 
changing Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm 
Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058 (1964), nothing was written about the 
subject until the mid-1970s. 
For a sample of the successive conflict literature from roughly the last 
decade, see Greene, Evergbody's Doing It-But Who Should Be? Standing to 
Make a Disqualification Motion Based on a n  Attorney's Representation of a 
Client with Interests Adverse to Those of a Former Client, 6 U. PUGET SOUND 
L. REV. 205 (1983); Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqual.tfication: The Rob  
of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996 (1979); Lindgren, Toward a 
New Standard of Attorney Disqualification, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 419; 
Morgan, Conflicts of Interests and the Former Client in the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.  993; Natale, The Super Law 
Firms and Disqualification in the Federal Courts: A n  Examination of City of 
Cleveland v. CEI, 4 4 m  L. REV. 287 (1981); Talley, Toward Chinese 
Walls: The Seventh Circuit Debates Rebuttable Presumptions in Vicarious 
Disqualification Cases, 11 S. ILL. U.L.J. 59 (1986); Note, Attorney's Conflict of 
Interests: hkpresentation of Interest Adverse to that of Former Client, 55 
B.U.L. REV. 61 (1975); Note, Motions to Disqualify Counsel Representing an  
Interest Adverse to a Former CZient, 57 TEX. L. REV. 726 (1979); Comment, Dis- 
qualification of Counsek Adverse Interests and Revolving Doors, 81 COLUM. L. 
REV. 199 (1981); Comment, The Ethics of Moving to Disqualifi Opposing 
Counsel for Conflict of Interest, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1310; Comment, Attorney Dis- 
qualification and Work Product Availability: A Proposed Analysis, 47 Mo. L. 
REV. 763 (1982); Comment, A Dilemma in Professional Responsibility: The 
Subsequent Representation Problem, 50 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 165 (1982); Com- 
ment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. 
REV. 677 (1980). 
Authors have also discussed the subject within larger ethics articles. See, 
e.g., Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807,833-48 (1977); Morgan, 
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only fourteen years after promulgating the second lawyer eth- 
ics code in half a century, the ABA passed the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.14 Unlike the 1969 Code, the 1983 Rules 
addressed both the successive conflict and imputed disqualifica- 
tion issues. The 1983 Rules recognized much of the previous 
decade's blitz of commentary and generally codified the dis- 
qualification rulings of a majority of courts by providing that a 
lawyer may not, in a substantially related matter, represent a 
client against a former client,15 and further that if one lawyer 
in a firm is disqualified from representation, all lawyers in that 
firm are disqualified.16 
This Article contends that the successive conflict and im- 
puted disqualification rules in combination are both bad law 
and bad ethics and that a different approach would be better 
for clients, for the adversary system, and for the profession. 
Part I of the Article analyzes the development of the successive 
conflict and the imputed disqualification doctrines. It demon- 
strates that two different, not always consistent, theories 
caused the successive conflict disqualification principles to de- 
velop erratically, resulting in a set of rules incompatible with 
either supporting rationale. Part I1 explains why the incorpo- 
ration of that set of rules into the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct leads to unreasonable results, demonstrates that suc- 
cessive conflict disqualification advances no adversary system 
interests, and offers alternative remedies. It suggests that the 
former client's disqualification gambit has become obnoxious to 
the reasonable operation of the civil justice system, clogging it 
with inappropriate disqualification motions that cause substan- 
tial individual and systemic damage. The Article concludes that 
courts should not hear, let alone grant, disqualification motions 
based on a lawyer's current opposition to a former client. It 
further urges the profession to withdraw those Model Rules 
concerned with successive conflict not only because they do not 
work well but also because they lack ethical justification. 
- - - -- 
The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 
728-31 (1977); Developments Note, Conflicts of Interests i n  the Legal Profes- 
sion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1315-34 (1981). 
14. Although the Model Rules were amended in 1984, they continue to be 
known as the 1983 Model Rules. Citations in this Article to the current Model 
Rules use the date of amendment. 
15. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983). 
16. Id. Rule 1.10. For a more detailed discussion of the intricacies of the 
Model Rules regarding successive conflict, see infra text accompanying and 
following notes 131-34. 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF SUCCESSIVE CONFLICT17 AND 
IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION 
Our adversary system of dispute resolution, with its substi- 
tution of lawyer adversaries for unschooled clients, is founded 
on the lawyer's absolute fidelity to the client.18 Indeed, every 
American ethical code since David Hoffman's fifty resolutions 
has characterized the lawyer as champion.19 Consequently, the 
system always condemned concurrent conflicts, such as simul- 
taneous or successive representation of both sides of the same 
lawsuit, and simultaneous representation of a client in one law- 
suit and opposition to that client in another unrelated lawsuit, 
as inconsistent with the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to 
17. This Article uses the phrase successive conflict to mean the 
representation of a new client against a former client. It uses this oxymoron 
not because the phrase makes analytic sense, but because it has become 
embedded in the cases and the literature. 
18. Lord Brougham's famous 1820 statement of the loyalty proposition 
may overstate the depth of commitment demanded of lawyers, but it accu- 
rately reflects the single-mindedness expected: 
[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows . . . 
[t]o save that client, by all expedient means, to protect that client, at 
all hazards and cost to all others . . . he must not regard the alarm, 
the suffering, the torment, the destruction, which he may bring upon 
any other. . . . 
1 H. BROUGHAM, SPEECHES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM 63 (1841). 
19. See 2 D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (2d ed. 1836). Describ- 
ing the lawyer's ethical obligations of loyalty to the client, Hoffman's resolu- 
tions stated: "If I have ever had any connection with a cause, I will never 
permit myself (when that connection is for any reason severed) to be engaged 
on the side of my former antagonist." Id. at 753 (Resolution VIII). "To my 
clients I will be faithful; and in their causes, zealous and industrious." Id. at 
758 (Resolution XVIII). 
The profession's 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, continuing Hoffman's 
theme of the lawyer as champion, provided: "The lawyer owes 'entire devo- 
tion to the interest of the client . . .' to the end that nothing be taken or be 
withheld from him, save by the rules of law. . . . [T]he client is entitled to the 
benefit of any and every remedy. . . that is authorized. . . ." CANONS OF PRO- 
FESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908). 
The concept of the lawyer as champion also is prominent in the 1969 Code, 
as amended, as well as the 1983 Model Rules. For example, Ethical Considera- 
tion 5-1 provides: 
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the 
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of com- 
promising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the 
interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be 
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1980); see also MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1984) ("Loyalty is an es- 
sential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client."). 
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the client.20 The adversary system's absolute prohibition 
against simultaneous representation of opponents reflects a 
concept entrenched firmly in our societal morality.21 Loyalty 
has never merely facilitated some greater good. It has always 
been a good in its own right, a necessity of character, an ethical 
imperative. 
Preservation of confidences, a concept almost as old in the 
law as loyalty, also was originally a matter of social morality- 
an ethical imperative for all good members of society. The at- 
torney-client privilege, which "appear[ed] as unquestioned" 
early in Elizabeth 1's was based not on any need or 
right of the client, but rather on the "obligations of honor 
among gentlemen2'-a class of Englishmen that included attor- 
n e y ~ . ~ ~  The lawyer's oath of honor and pledge of secrecy to the 
client, as necessary attributes of a gentleman, justified the at- 
torney-client privilege.24 The honor of gentlemen, however, 
was insufficient to sustain the law's deference to secrets at the 
expense of justice. By the mid-eighteenth century, the concept 
of gentlemen's honor was gone from the law,25 although missed 
by many.26 
20. See, e.g., In re Boone, 83 F. 944 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (successive, same 
lawsuit); Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,733) (si- 
multaneous, different lawsuits); Strong v. International Bldg., Loan & Inv. 
Union, 183 Ill. 97, 55 N.E. 675 (1899) (simultaneous, same lawsuit). The advo- 
cate unencumbered by a concurrent interest that might diminish full vigor in 
representation constitutes the hallmark of the adversary system. 
Indeed, lawyer conflicts of interest were explicitly prohibited by statute as 
early as the London Ordinance of 1280. 2 MUNIMENTA GILDHALLE LONDONIEN- 
SIS pt. 2, at 596-97 (H. Riley ed. London 1860). The operation of the adversary 
system assumes the resolution of truth by a neutral party upon the hearing of 
opposing sides. 
21. See Exodus 20:3 (King James) ("Thou shalt have no other gods before 
me."); Matthew 6:24 (King James) ("No man can serve two masters: for either 
he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and 
despise the other."). 
22. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE $2290, at 542 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
23. Id. 5 2286, at 530. 
24. Id. $2286, at 530, $2290, at 543. 
25. See, e.g., The Trial of James Hill, reprinted in 20 A COMPLETE COL- 
LECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1318, 1362 (T. Howell ed. London 1816) (1777) ("[Ilf 
this point of honour was to be so sacred . . . that a man . . . not be at liberty to 
disclose it, the most atrocious criminals would every day escape punishment; 
and therefore it is that the wisdom of the law knows nothing of that point of 
honour."). 
26. For example, one judge lamented that "[ilt is indeed hard in many 
cases to compel a friend to disclose a confidential conversation; and I should be 
glad if by law such evidence could be excluded." Wilson v. Rastall, 100 Eng. 
Rep. 1283, 1287, 4 Term Rep. 753, 759 (1792). 
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The attorney-client privilege did not, however, expire with 
the gentleman's privilege. A new, utilitarian theory that 
"looked to the necessity of providing subjectively for the cli- 
ent's freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal advisor" 
arrived to support the privilege.27 Despite the doctrinal substi- 
tution of freedom of apprehension for gentlemen's honor, the 
language of the latter did not quickly vanish.28 Loyalty lan- 
guage lingered in the case law29 and was incorporated into early 
27. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 23, $2290, at 543 (emphasis added). See gener- 
ally id. $ 2291, at 545-54 (explaining fully the policy underlying the modern 
privilege). Wigmore asserts that the explanation given by Mounteney in 
Annesley v. Earl ofAngZesea provided one of the foremost statements of the 
new theory supporting the privilege: 
[A]n increase of legal business, and the inabilities of parties to trans- 
act that business themselves, made it necessary for them to employ 
. . . other persons who might transact that business for them; that this 
necessity introduced with it the necessity of what the law hath very 
justly established, an inviolable secrecy to be observed by attornies, in 
order to render it safe for clients to communicate to their attornies all 
proper instructions for the carrying on those causes which they found 
themselves under a necessity of intrusting to their care. 
Id. $ 2291, at 546 (quoting Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, reprinted in 17 A 
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1139, 1241 (T. Howell ed. London 
1816) (1743)). 
McCormick states the modern theory of the privilege and confidences 
succinctly: 
This was the theory that claims and disputes which may lead to litiga- 
tion can most justly and expeditiously be handled by practised ex- 
perts, namely lawyers, and that these experts can act effectively only 
if they are fully advised of the facts by the parties whom they repre- 
sent. Full disclosure will be promoted if the client knows that what 
he tells his lawyer cannot, over his objection, be extorted in court 
from the lawyer's lips. 
E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE $ 87, at 20405 (3d ed. 1984). 
28. Wigmore quotes Gilbert's eighteenth century evidence tieatise to 
demonstrate that the loyalty foundation for the gentleman's honor doctrine 
was often mingled with, and thus confused the development of, the modern 
theory that the privilege facilitates consultation by giving the client freedom of 
apprehension: 
After the retainer, they are considered as the same person with their 
clients and are trusted with their secrets, which without a breach of 
confidence cannot be revealed, and without such sort of confidence 
there could be no trust or dependence on any man, nor any transact- 
ing of affairs by the ministry or mediation of another; and therefore 
the law in this case maintains such sort of confidence inviolable. 
8 WIGMORE, supra note 22, $2290, at 543 n.3 (quoting G. GILBERT, THE L A W  OF 
EVIDENCE 138 (London ed. 1756)). 
29. See, e.g., United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889). A fa- 
mous loyalty-based disbarment action in which a lawyer secretly tried to 
switch sides, Costen helped to perpetuate the loyalty language of confidences 
by describing Costen's disloyalty in terms of one of its consequences-the shar- 
ing of secrets: 
mt  is the glory of our profession that its fidelity to its client can be 
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ethical statements of the profession's concern for confidences. 
For example, the ABA's first formulation of professional 
ethics refers to confidentiality only as a consequence of the re- 
quirement of undivided fidelity. This single concern for confi- 
dentiality, found in Canon 6, prepared the way for courts to 
extend the ethical duty of loyalty beyond the expiration of the 
attorney-client relationship and to thereby create the successive 
conflict. Canon 6 proclaimed: "The obligation to represent the 
client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or 
confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers 
or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any 
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been 
reposed."3O 
A. C. THEATRE AND LASKEY;' THE ODD COUPLE'S 
APPROACHES TO CANON 6
In 1953 Judge Weinfeld relied on Canon 6 to resolve the 
problem of a lawyer representing an interest adverse to a for- 
mer client. In T.C. Theatre COW. v. Warner Bros. P i c t ~ r e s , ~ ~  
Thomas Cooke, a lawyer who had previously defended Univer- 
sal Pictures against antitrust conspiracy charges, represented 
the operator of a chain of theaters seeking antitrust damages 
from U n i ~ e r s a l . ~ ~  Although concerned with the preservation of 
confidences, Judge Weinfeld based his decision to disqualify 
Cooke on a loyalty rationale,33 adopting the unending fidelity 
depended upon; that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse 
with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with the 
absolute assurance that that lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclos- 
ing it; and any lawyer who proves false to such an obligation, and be- 
trays or seeks to betray any information or any facts that he has 
attained while employed on the one side, is guilty of the grossest 
breach of trust. 
Id. at 24. 
30. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908). 
31. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
32. In addition to Universal, Cooke also sought damages from seven other 
motion picture producers and distributors on behalf of his client. Id. at 267. 
33. The court, demonstrating its concern for confidences, stated that 
"[mlatters disclosed by clients under the protective seal of the attorney-client 
relationship and intended in their defense should not be used as weapons of 
offense." Id. at 269. The Canons of Professional Ethics contained a specific 
provision-Canon 37, "Confidences of Clientn-designed to preserve client 
confidences which could have formed the basis for the court's decision to dis- 
qualify Cooke. Canon 37 provided: "The duty to preserve his client's confi- 
dences outlasts the lawyer's employment . . . . A lawyer should not continue 
employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance 
of his full duty to his former or to his new client." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL 
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position of Canon 6: "A lawyer's duty of absolute loyalty to his 
client's interests does not end with his retainer. He is enjoined 
for all time . . . from disclosing matters revealed to him by rea- 
son of the confidential relation~hip."3~ 
Judge Weinfeld's opinion reads as if he intended to adopt 
Canon 6 as written, prohibiting any representation "adversely 
affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confi- 
ETHICS Canon 37 (1951). The court, however, consciously avoided the invita- 
tion to decide the case under Canon 37 and relied instead on Canon 6, "Con- 
flicting Interests," and its fidelity language. T.C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 271. 
Judge Weinfeld acknowledged that "an important purpose of the rule of se- 
crecy" is "to encourage clients fully and freely to make known to their attor- 
neys all facts pertinent to their cause." Id. at 269. He was, therefore, aware of 
the freedom of apprehension theory of the privilege, but he was unwilling to 
identify that, rather than loyalty, as the foundation for the Canon 6 concern 
for confidences. 
Judge Weinfeld further demonstrated his reliance on loyalty as the justiii- 
cation for the protection of confidences by his use of precedent. Four of the 
five cases cited as authority for the rule proscribing a subsequent adverse rep- 
resentation substantially related to a former representation were pure loyalty 
matters, in which the lawyers were prohibited from turning against a client in 
the same matter-the classic adversary system loyalty problem. See id. at 268 
(citing Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Wash. 1946) (defendant's attor- 
neys disqualified because they had been counsel for government agency bring- 
ing action at or shortly before its filing); In  re Maltby, 68 Ariz. 153, 202 P.2d 
904 (1949) (attorney reprimanded for representing husband in attempt to mod- 
ify child custody following representation of wife in divorce action); People v. 
Gerold, 265 Ill. 448,107 N.E. 165 (1914) (failure to disqualify prosecution attor- 
ney, who had previously represented and advised criminal defendant regarding 
same general matters for which he was indicted, is reversible error); Federal 
. . 
Trust CO. v. Damron, 124 Neb. 655,247 N.W. 589 (1933) (attorney may not rep- 
resent parties challenging validity of trust agreement which attorney drew up 
for former client, even though former client was deceased)). 
Ironically, the single authority concerning confidences in a subsequent ad- 
verse representation cited by Judge Weinfeld, Watson v. Watson, 171 Misc. 175, 
11 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939), would not meet the Second Circuit's cur- 
rent interpretation of Judge Weinfeld's substantial relationship test and thus 
would not require disqualification. See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying 
text. Watson involved disqualification of the wife's lawyer in her action of an- 
nulment against her husband for fraud in asserting that he was a man of good 
character. The wife's lawyer had represented the husband in defense of a 
criminal charge years earlier. The court based its disqualification decision on 
the propositiok that a court would not prohibit representation against a former 
client unless the lawyer obtained information prejudicial to the former client 
in the present case. -Watson, 171 Misc. at 176, ft N.Y.S.2d at 538 (citing E. 
WEEKS, WEEKS ON ATTORNEYS AT LAW 5 271, at 455, 3 279, at 466 (1878)). The 
Watson court, therefore, permitted disqualification even though the identity of 
the issues involved in the former criminal matter and the current annulment 
action was not patently clear. 
34. T.C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268. 
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dence has been reposed."35 His phrasing, however, led to a dif- 
ferent rule: "[Wlhere any substantial relationship can be 
shown between the subject matter of a former representation 
and that of a subsequent adverse representation, the latter will 
be pr~hibi ted ."~~ 
Two years after T.C. Theatre, in Laskey Bros. v. Warner 
Bros.  picture^,^^ the Second Circuit faced the same issue of 
protecting an adverse party's confidences. As presented, the 
problem had a new twist: the target of the disqualification mo- 
tions had never represented any of the parties. The plaintiff's 
lawyer, Arnold Malkan, sued Warner Brothers and others in 
two separate civil antitrust cases.38 Malkan had started the 
Laskey case while partners with David Isacson, a lawyer who 
had represented Warner Brothers while at another firm. The 
Laskey court disqualified Malkan, holding that there was an ir- 
rebuttable presumption that partners share confidential infor- 
mation. Because Isacson would have been barred from 
representation, his partner Malkan was di~qualified.~~ The 
court had no strong case precedent for either barring a disquali- 
fied lawyer's partner40 or for an irrebuttable shared confi- 
35. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1951) (emphasis added). 
Judge Weinfeld stated: 
In cases of this sort, the Court must ask whether it can reasonably be 
said that in the course of the former representation the attorney 
might have acquired information related to the subject of his subse- 
quent representation. If so, then the relationship between the two 
matters is sufficiently close to bring the later representation within 
the prohibition of Canon 6. 
T.C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 269. 
36. T.C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. a t  268 (emphasis added). Judge Weinfeld 
stated that "[tlhis salutory principle is summed up in Canon 6." Id. 
37. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956). 
38. Warner Brothers's motions to disqualify Malkan in both cases were 
consolidated for hearing. Id. at 825. 
39. Id. at 827. 
40. The court cited Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Man- 
agement Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954) and a 1955 Note, see Note, supra 
note 3, for the proposition that all partners are barred from representation 
when one is disqualified. Laskey, 224 F.2d at 826. The Consolidated Theatres 
court disqualified a lawyer and his partner, but the lawyers never raised the 
separate issue of the partner's disqualification and the court never discussed it. 
The single sentence in the Note regarding imputed disqualification cited two 
cases in which the proposition was stated as dictum. See Note, supra note 3, at 
920. In one case the issue was not raised, but the court assumed that imputed 
disqualification was appropriate as if the issue had been raised. Christian v. 
Waialua Agric. Co., 30 Haw. 533, 551 (1928). In the second case, a disbarment 
proceeding, the facts did not raise the issue at all, but the court nevertheless 
stated the matter as obiter dictum. In  re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, 63, 10 P. 47, 65 
(1886). 
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dences p r e s~mpt ion .~~  It  relied, therefore, on what it 
contended was the underlying rationale for both Canons 6 and 
37: preserving a client's freedom of apprehension in disclosing 
confidences to a lawyer.42 That rationale, according to the 
court, justified extending the Canons' prohibitions beyond the 
lawyer who had received the confidence to the lawyer's part- 
ners as 
The court refused, however, to make the presumption of 
shared confidences irrebuttable in every situation because the 
chain of disqualification would never end.44 Consequently, the 
court did not disqualify Malkan from the second case, an identi- 
cal antitrust action against Warner Brothers. Unlike Laskey, 
that litigation had come to Malkan's firm after Isacson had left. 
The court explained the difference by saying that once the 
partnership was over, the presumption of confidence sharing 
"becomes logically less compelling and should therefore be- 
come reb~ttable."~S 
41. In !Z!C !l'heatre Judge Weinfeld rejected a theory of presumed sharing 
of confidences. In addition to Cooke, the moving party asked Judge Weinfeld 
to disqualify the law firm that had hired Cooke to work with it on behalf of 
T.C. Theatre. Not only was Judge Weinfeld unwilling to bar lawyers associ- 
ated with the disqualified lawyer by finding an irrebuttable presumption of 
shared confidences, he was unwilling to find any presumption at all. He 
stated: 
Movant . . . presses upon the Court a "presumption" that [Gorfinkle & 
Adler] must have retained Cooke in order to make use of confidential 
information he received in the course of his former employment. It is 
not clear why [the court] should presume the attorneys have acted un- 
ethically. On the contrary, [the court] would presume that messrs. 
Garfinkle & Adler had no such motiviation. Cooke was probably re- 
tained for the same reason that Universal retained him in the Para- 
mount case-because of his special expertise in antitrust matters. 
T.C. !i"heatre, 113 F. Supp. at 272. 
42. See Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956). 
43. The court explained: "Such a result, although an extension of the lit- 
eral wording of Canons 6 and 37 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the 
American Bar Association, is necessary to facilitate maximum disclosure of 
relevant facts on the part of clients!' Id. at 827. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. The applicability of this assertion in Laskq is not clear. Malkan 
represented Laskey Brothers and Austin Theater in two separate antitrust 
suits against Warner Brothers. Warner's motions to disqualify Malkan in both 
cases were consolidated for hearing. The court disqualified Malkan from the 
Laskey litigation, but not from the Austin Theaters suit. See id.  Yet, the con- 
fidences and secrets held by Malkan were equally useful in both cases because 
the defendant was the same in both cases. If the court meant to suggest that 
there was greater coincidence of opportunity with possible motive to disclose a 
confidence when the lawsuit and the partner were at the firm simultaneously, 
the court did not say so. 
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Although both T.C. Theatre and Laskey involved Canon 6 
and the use of disqualification to protect the sanctity of prior 
confidences, they based the disqualifications on different analy- 
ses." The T.C. Theatre court identified loyalty as the rationale 
for Canon 6 and as the appropriate approach to protection of 
confidences. The Laskey court, however, considered the client's 
freedom of apprehension in consulting with counsel the appro- 
priate approach, extending Canons 6 and 37 beyond their plain 
meaning to include associates of the lawyer to whom the disclo- 
sures were made. 
B. THE STANDARD OIL CHANGE IN T.C. THEATRE'S 
SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP RULE: LESS LOYALTY, 
MORE CONFIDENCE 
The T.C. Theatre court used the phrase substantial rela- 
tionship to explain Canon 6's application of a loyalty obligation 
to a former client and to establish the condition of proof that 
required disqualification. Once the substantial relationship be- 
tween the former and subsequent matters was demonstrated, 
disqualification followed. The court developed the substantial 
relationship test, in part, from a concern that the client's at- 
tempt to demonstrate his former lawyer's knowledge of confi- 
dential information would require disclosure of that 
information, defeating the purpose of the disqualification mo- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  The court therefore assumed that the client had dis- 
closed confidences relevant to the subject matter of the first 
suit during the former representa t i~n.~~ Judge Weinfeld used 
the finding of substantial relationship to foreclose a defense to 
disqualification based on the nonacquisition of confidential 
information. 
Since T.C. Theatre, however, many courts have used the 
substantial relationship test merely to shift the burden of proof 
in successive conflict disqualification cases. In United States v. 
Standard Oil Co.,4"he government alleged that Standard had 
overcharged in Marshall Plan transactions financed by the Eco- 
nomic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Standard was repre- 
46. In contrast to T.C. Theatre, the duties of loyalty and fidelity were 
never mentioned in the Laskey court's discussion of the proper presumptions 
regarding the sharing of confidential information that might lead to disqualifi- 
cation. Id. 
47. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
48. Id. at 268. 
49. 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
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sented by a Sullivan & Cromwell partner who had been the 
General Counsel in the ECA's Paris office during the time of 
the alleged overcharges. To avoid disqualification and to ac- 
commodate circumstances different from those faced in T.C. 
Theatre-namely, that a former government lawyer was the 
target of the disqualification motion-Judge Kaufman had to 
dilute the effect of T.C. Theatre's almost total prohibition on 
representation against a former client. In doing so he had to 
disconnect the substantial relationship test from its loyalty 
base.50 To facilitate the disconnection, Judge Kaufman decided 
that preservation of confidences, rather than loyalty, was the 
value to protect.51 He looked at the nature of the first 
attorney-client relationship to determine whether there was a 
risk that the lawyer received confidences that might be used in 
the second repre~entat ion.~~ The court thus reduced the sub- 
stantial relationship test from a description of the condition 
that prohibited subsequent representation to a mere burden- 
shifting device justifying "an inference that confidential infor- 
mation was reposed."53 If the inference failed, the party seek- 
ing disqualification was "left with the burden of proving actual 
knowledge."54 
Having disconnected substantial relationship from loyalty 
and attached it to confidences, Judge Kaufman then had to con- 
front Laskey's irrebuttable presumption that members of a law 
firm share  confidence^.^^ He began by asserting that the pre- 
50. If loyalty to a former client was the important value the substantial 
relationship test for disqualification was intended to vindicate, the former 
General Counsel of the ECA's Paris office could not possibly stay in the litiga- 
tion against the ECA. 
51. Standard Oil, 136 F. Supp. at 356. The court justified the disconnec- 
tion of the substantial relationship rule from its loyalty base by alluding to the 
analytic difference between disqualifications based on loyalty and those based 
on confidences. Observing that almost all of the previous substantial relation- 
ship court decisions involved side switching by the lawyer in the same incident 
or trial or concerned documents drafted by the lawyer, the court stated that 
those loyalty cases were of "no guidance" for the Standard Oil facts. Id. 
52. The TC! Theatre court, on the other hand, had assumed that loyalty 
was the value in the attorney-client relationship to protect. Accordingly, the 
court examined the relationship between assumed confidences in the first rep- 
resentation and the subject matter of the second representation to determine 
whether the loyalty value was endangered. 
53. Standard Oil, 136 F. Supp. at 354 (emphasis added). 
54. Id. 
55. The Laskq~ court's presumption was that "knowledge of one member 
of a law firm will be imputed by inference to all members of that firm." Id. at 
' 360 (citing Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 
1955)). 
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sumption for private law firms relied on a premise that infor- 
mation flows freely within a partnership office.56 The 
governmental situation, with large offices in different cities, di- 
visions and subdivisions within those offices, and lawyers prac- 
ticing in narrow areas, might, he suggested, justify a different 
assumption about the likelihood that a lawyer would review all 
of the files to which the lawyer had theoretical access.57 
In a discussion aimed at deciding whether the imputed 
knowledge theory applied to government the court 
pointed to Canon 36's language forbidding a former government 
attorney from accepting employment concerning a matter the 
lawyer had "investigated or passed upon" while with the gov- 
ernment.59 The Canon, without more, seemed to support al- 
lowing the former government lawyer to remain in the 
Standard Oil litigation, as long as he had neither investigated 
nor decided anything concerning the alleged overcharges while 
with the ECA. The court did not, however, use Canon 36 to 
avoid disqualification, emphasizing that undoubtedly the Ca- 
nons intended "to avoid [even] the appearance that an attorney 
has taken a position contradictory to his former client's inter- 
e s t ~ . " ~ ~  Thus, according to the court, Canon 36 did not insulate 
former government lawyers entirely from the Laskey presump- 
tion of shared confidences concerning matters not investigated 
or passed upon.G1 
Nevertheless, in language not limited to the government 
lawyer, the Standard Oil court refused to disqualify, thereby 
laying the foundation for the future debate over the rebut- 
tability of the shared confidences presumption. The court 
stated that it was unlikely that the Canons of Professional Eth- 
ics were "intended to disqualify an attorney who did not actu- 
ally come into contact with materials substantially related to 
the controversy at hand when he was acting as attorney for a 
former client now adverse to his p~s i t i on . "~~  
T.C. Theatre, Laskey, and Standard Oil set the stage for the 
56. See id. Judge Kaufman cited no authority for this rather novel notion. 
57. Id. at 361. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. Canon 36 provided that "[a] lawyer, having once . . . been in the 
public employ, should not . . . accept employment in connection with any mat- 
ter which he investigated or passed upon while in such . . . employ." CANONS 
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 36 (1951). 
60. Standard Oil, 136 F. Supp. at 361 (emphasis added). 
61. Id. at 362. 
62. Id. at 364 (emphasis added). 
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explosion of successive conflict disqualification motions that 
would begin years later. Those cases had identified the issues 
and factors that would be important to the successive conflict 
disqualification debate. Substantial relationship, although con- 
ceived as a phrase to explain the former client loyalty ethic in 
Canon 6, already had been used or misused as a presumption 
about confidences. Imputed disqualification, a doctrine devised 
to preserve the client's freedom of apprehension in sharing con- 
fidences with a lawyer, had previewed the compounding prob- 
lem successive conflict disqualification would present for large 
law firms. Appearance of impropriety, a theory that would 
eventually support irrebuttable presumptions under the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility, had already been recog- 
nized by courts as implicit in the Canons of Professional Ethics. 
Former government lawyers had been identified as a special 
group, and the courts' willingness to engage in a functional 
analysis of their situation carried the potential for changing the 
successive conflict analysis for private lawyers as well. 
C. A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION F R SUCCESSIVE CONFLICT: 
CONFIDENCES AND THE A P P E ~ C E  OF IMTROPRIETY 
In promulgating its 1969 Code of Professional Responsibil- 
ity, the ABA withdrew Canon 6 and its loyalty justification for 
prohibiting subsequent employment against former clients. 
The new Code, lacking an express prohibition of successive con- 
flict, contained only an oblique reference to the issue in an Eth- 
ical Consideration under Canon 4's terse admonition that "[a] 
lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a cli- 
ent."63 Ethical Consideration 4-5 asked the lawyer to take 
"[clare . . . to prevent the disclosure of the confidences and 
secrets of one client to another" and advised that "no employ- 
ment should be accepted that might require such disclosure."~4 
Canon 5 of the 1969 Code contained the conflict of interest dis- 
cussion previously in Canon 6 but did not mention the succes- 
sive conflict apparently because the problem of a 
former client's confidences was not a conflict problem. If for- 
mer clients were a problem at all, they were a Canon 4 confi- 
dences and secrets problem. 
Although the 1969 Code abandoned the loyalty justification 
for prohibiting successive conflict, Judge Kaufman, who had 
63. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1969). 
64. Id. EC 4-5. 
65. See id. Canon 5. 
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authored Standard Oil fourteen years earlier, rescued T.C. 
Theatre's substantial relationship-loyalty analysis by interpret- 
ing it into the 1969 Code. In Emle Industries v. Patentex, Inc.,66 
the plaintiff's lawyer in a patent suit had previously repre- 
sented the defendant in a suit involving the same patents. The 
defendant moved to disqualify, and the plaintiff countered with 
a claim that the lawyer had received no confidential informa- 
tion from the defendant in the former matter.67 To resurrect 
the T.C. Theatre substantial relationship-loyalty analysis, Judge 
Kaufman maintained that the prohibition against subsequent 
retainers in former Canon 6 was "implicitly incorporate[dIn into 
the new Canon 4's one-line admonition to preserve confidences 
and secrets.68 The court contended that the underlying reason 
for preserving confidences-protecting a client's freedom of ap- 
prehension--demanded the result. If courts did not strictly en- 
force high ethical standards, clients would not discuss their 
problems freely because they would fear that information re- 
vealed one day could be used against them the n e ~ t . 6 ~  
The plaintiff's contention that the lawyer had not received 
confidential information during the previous representation70 
forced Judge Kaufman to deal with his Standard Oil statement 
that the Canons of Professional Ethics probably were not in- 
tended to disqualify a lawyer who had not "actually come into 
contact with materials substantially related."71 To avoid al- 
lowing the Emle Industries plaintiffs an opportunity to demon- 
strate that their lawyer had in fact received no confidential 
information in the former representation and without Canon 6 
to rely on, Judge Kaufman turned to the new Canon 9. He ar- 
gued that Canon 9's prohibition of the appearance of irnpropri- 
-- 
66. 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973). 
67. Id. at 572. The former representation had begun when one of 
Patentex's licensees asked if it could manufacture a particular stretch support 
stocking without infringing on a Kayser-Roth patent. Id. at 565. Patentex 
granted several licensees permission to manufacture, but indicated that 
Patentex would not defend them against any patent infringement suit by 
Kayser-Roth. Id. at 566. The licensees then hired Rabin to seek a declaratory 
judgment that the Kayser-Roth patent was invalid. Patentex and its parent, 
Burlington Industries, eventually joined the suit. The plaintiffs in Emle In- 
dustries contended that Rabin received no confidential information from 
Patentex, who was only a technical plaintiff in the first action, and that any 
information that might be helpful in the Emle Industries litigation was either 
contained in a stipulation or was public knowledge in the industry. Id. at 572. 
68. Id. at 570. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 571. 
71. United States v. Standard Oil, 136 F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
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ety justified disqualification as strongly as the actual 
impropriety itself.72 Ignoring his own Standard Oil change, he 
thus reverted to the T.C. Theatre court's position, holding that 
the substantial relationship test created an irrebuttable pre- 
sumption that confidences were acquired in the first 
repre~entation.~~ 
D. SILVER CHRYSLER' THE STANDARD OIL CHANGE FOR 
PRIVATE LAWYERS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
The reconstruction of the original substantial relationship 
doctrine in Emle Industries lasted no longer than T.C. Theatre 's 
broad prohibition against successive conflict. Under circum- 
stances reminiscent of those that persuaded the Standard Oil 
court to change the nature of substantial relationship, the court 
in Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors C0rp.~4 diluted 
the disqualification effect of EmZe Industries's reconstructed 
substantial relationship t e ~ t . 7 ~  
Silver Chrysler was the first important successive conflict 
case in which the imputed disqualification motion was based on 
72. Emle Industries, 478 F.2d at 571. Judge Kaufman cited an ABA infor- 
mal opinion which stated that "a lawyer should avoid representation of a party 
in a suit against a former client, where there may be the appearance of a possi- 
ble violation of confidence, even though this may not be true in fact." Id. 
(quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 885 (1965)). 
Judge Kaufman would no doubt argue that the proof he allowed in Stan- 
dard Oil-that the Washington and Paris offices of the ECA were separate-- 
differed from the proof he refused in Emle Industries-that the lawyer did not 
actually hold confidatial information from the previous employment. 
Whatever validity this distinction might have for determining whether confi- 
dences were reposed in the attorney, it is irrelevant to the Canon 9 issue of 
how the representation appears to others. 
73. Id. 
74. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). 
75. The harsh tone of the district court decision in Silver Chrysler dif- 
fered significantly from the tone of the circuit court's opinion. The appellate 
court's closeness to its chief judge, whose Emb Industries decision was se- 
verely undercut by Silver Chrysler, and the district court's closeness with the 
changing practice of law may explain the tonal difference. Indeed, an entire 
section of the district court opinion concentrates on the "Dangers of Unneces- 
sary Restrictions on Young Attorneys": 
A concern both for the future of young professionals and for the 
freedom of choice of the litigant in specialized areas of law requires 
care not to disqualify needlessly. . . . 
Changing times have resulted in continual modification of the 
practitioner's ethical . . . role[] . . . . Rules appropriate in guiding law- 
yers of several decades ago must be applied in light of current reali- 
ties. 
. . . The mode of assignment of work to young associates in mod- 
ern large law firms make [sic] unreasonable a rule of disqualification 
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the lawyer's previous private employment. The Silver Chrysler 
dealership sued to enjoin Chrysler Motors from raising its rent 
in abrogation of a 1967 Dealer Relocation Agreement. From 
1966 to 1969, Silver Chrysler's lawyer had been an associate 
with Kelley Drye, the law firm listed as counsel in Chrysler 
Motors's annual reports. During his thirty-two months with 
Kelley Drye, he had, among other things,76 participated in dis- 
cussions about procedural matters in the Chrysler Motors deal- 
ership litigation and had researched specific points of law in the 
dealership cases.77 The plaintiffs argued that imputed disquali- 
fication was not appropriate because their lawyer, while at Kel- 
ley Drye, had neither worked on matters substantially related 
nor acquired confidential information from other lawyers 
working on matters substantially related. 
Bypassing analyses under T.C. Theatre-Emle Industries or 
Laslcey, either of which would have led to disqualifi~ation,~~ the 
which would prevent them from ever litigating against clients of their 
former firm. . . . 
The dangers are enhanced by an increasing trend towards concen- 
tration in the legal profession. . . . 
. . . .  
The problem is not limited to associates in large firms. It exists 
in smaller communities where a few law firms handle most of the 
commercial practice or in national firms of a modest size specializing 
in areas of law or commerce. . . . 
. . . .  
Antitrust implications in unduly restricting the work of the larg- 
est law firms' former associates are not insubstantial since these firms 
have as clients corporations that control a major share of the Ameri- 
can economy. . . . The Canons of Ethics furnish no warrant for illegal 
restraints on trade. 
Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589-91 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (citations omitted), aff 'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). 
As Silver Chrysler demonstrates, the gap between the substantial relation- 
ship theory and the reality of practice has always been more readily apparent 
to trial courts than to appellate courts. Similarly, the difference between the 
circumstances of the government lawyer and the assumptions of the substan- 
tial relationship finding was more apparent to District Court Judge Kaufman 
in Standard Oil than the difference between the circumstances of the large 
firm practitioner and the assumptions of the substantial relationship finding 
was to Circuit Court Judge Kaufman in Emle Industries. District Court Judge 
Weinstein, the trial judge in Silver Chrysler, saw the same gap that had im- 
pressed District Judge Kaufman. Id. at 588. 
76. The lawyer had also defended Chrysler Motors in an antitrust suit and 
handled portions of a hotel eviction for Chrysler Motors's real estate 
subsidiary. 
77. Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 756. 
78. Had the Silver Chrysler court proceeded as T.C. Theatre and Emle In- 
dustries suggested, it would have analyzed the relationship between the 
Chrysler Motors matters at Kelley Drye and the present suit against Chrysler 
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Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision not to disqual- 
ify the lawyer and, in doing so, changed both the substantial re- 
lationship test and the irrebuttability of the presumption of ,  
shared confidences within a law firm. The court, relying on its 
analysis of previous Second Circuit successive conflict cases, be- 
gan by redefining substantial relationship. In every case order- 
ing disqualification, the similarity of the issues involved in the 
previous and contested representations was "patently clear."79 
The court therefore held that a substantial relationship existed 
only when the identity between the issues involved in the two 
matters was patently clear.80 
The court also changed the irrebuttable presumption that 
members of law firms share confidences among themselves. It 
purported to rely on Standard Oil and Laskey for the rule that 
the "inference . . . that an attorney . . . received confidential in- 
formation transmitted by a client to the firm . . . is a rebuttable 
Motors. The analysis would have assumed that confidential information about 
all of Kelley Drye's Chrysler Motors matters had come to the former associ- 
ate. The court would then have determined whether those assumed confi- 
dences related to any Chrysler Motors interest involved in the present suit. If 
they had, the former Kelley Drye associate, now the plaintiff's lawyer, would 
have been disqualified. Under either the loyalty theory of T.C. meatre or the 
appearance of impropriety theory of Emle Industries, the former associate's 
actual possession of confidences would have been irrelevant. Because Kelley 
Drye had handled dealership cases, its former associate would have been dis- 
qualified for successive conflict. 
The court also might have proceeded solely as if the case presented a 
Laskey imputed disqualification problem. While Laskey involved former part- 
ners, its analysis is equally applicable to former associates. Had the court ap- 
plied Laskey, it would have decided that "within the framework of [Kelley 
Drye] the fact of access to confidential information through the person of the 
[lawyer] with such specialized knowledge is sufficient to bar the [former asso- 
ciate] whether or not [he] actually profitfed] from such access." Laskey Bros. 
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824,827 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
932 (1956). The result would have been the same as under the substantial rela- 
tionship analysis. That is, the court would have disqualified the former associ- - 
ate because he had access to information from other lawyers at Kelley Drye 
who had specialized knowledge of Chrysler Motors. The Silver Chrysler court 
could have justified its application of the Laskey doctrine to all lawyers cur- 
rently or formerly at Kelley Drye by relying on the holding in Consolidated 
Theaters v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 
1954) that all partners are barred from representation when one is disquali- 
fied, and by recognizing that the presumption analysis depends on actual in- 
volvement, not on position as either associate or partner. 
79. Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 754. 
80. Id. Silver Chrysler's departure from the T.C. meatre view that there 
was a substantial relationship if a confidence from the first representation 
might matter in the second, could not have been more stark. 
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one,"81 ignoring Emle Industries's contrary conclusion. The 
Court misread Laskey in relying on that case for the rule that 
the presumption of shared confidences can be rebutted.82 In 
Laskey the only information disclosed to a firm by a client was 
the Warner Brothers information disclosed to Isacson while he 
was at his first firm. The Laskey court held the presumption 
irrebuttable that Isacson had shared that information with Mal- 
kan in their subsequent firm's representation of Laskey Broth- 
e r ~ . ~ ~  By both resurrecting Standard Oil and misreading 
Laskey, the court undermined the foundation for Laskey's au- 
tomatic disqualification theory. 
Equally important was the court's handling of Emle Indus- 
tries's appearance of impropriety theory. The court rejected ap- 
pearance as the determining factor in successive conflict cases. 
The court asserted that the refusal to disqualify would not cre- 
ate an appearance of impr~p r i e ty .~~  Chrysler could not reason- 
ably expect to foreclose all lawyers previously and currently 
with the firm who had represented Chrysler on unrelated mat- 
ters from representing an opposing party.85 Canon 9 was not 
"intended completely to override the delicate balance created 
by Canon 4."86 After Silver Chrysler the appearance of impro- 
81. Id. 
82. The Silver Chrysler court never explained or justified its erroneous in- 
terpretation of Laskey. The court might have distinguished Laskey theoreti- 
cally in a way that Emle Industries might have distinguished Standard Oil. 
Both the Silver Chrysler and Emle Industries courts could have argued that as 
to the rebuttability of the presumption of acquisition of confidences, there is a 
difference between disclosure by the client and repetition of a confidence by 
another lawyer in the firm. The operation of the adversary system depends on 
disclosure by the client, and courts should presume that such disclosure oc- 
curred. On the other hand, discussion of client confidences between members 
of a firm who are not working on the same matter, although not discouraged, 
is unlikely. At a minimum courts should allow a lawyer to prove that what is 
unlikely did not in fact happen. The Silver C%rysler court made no attempt to 
distinguish Laskey in this fashion. 
83. Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824,827 (2d Cir. 1955), 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); see also supra text accompanying notes 37-45. 
84. Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 757. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. The trial court's rejection of Canon 9 as a basis for disqualification 
was more direct: 
[C]omplexities of the factual determination to be made . . . should 
[not] be avoided by a decision couched in notions of possible appear- 
ance of impropriety. . . . The danger of damage to public confidence in 
the legal profession would be great if we were to allow unfounded 
charges of impropriety to form the sole basis for an unjust 
disqualification. 
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priety theory never again supported a successive conflict dis- 
qualification in the Second Circuit. 
Silver C%ryslerYs patently clear test for defining substantial 
relationship and its rebuttable presumption of shared confi- 
dences dramatically changed future analysis of successive con- 
flict-imputed disqualification cases.87 Despite the increase in 
successive conflict motions, disqualifications declined in the 
Second Circuit after Silver Chrysler. Uncertainty about the 
ethical base for successive conflict disqualification was responsi- 
ble, at least in part, for the Second Circuit's decision to stay out 
of the ethics business.88 Instead, future Second Circuit disquali- 
fication analyses would focus on preserving the integrity of the 
trial process, leaving ethical conflicts to be "addressed by the 
'comprehensive disciplinary machinery' of the state and federal 
bar."89 
E. OUTSIDE THE SECOND CIRCUIT: SUCCESS~VE CONFLICT 
WEST OF THE HUDSON 
As the Second Circuit began to reduce the number of attor- 
ney disqualifications by tightening the criteria and rethinking 
the propriety of judicial enforcement of ethical norms, courts 
west of the Hudsongo began to face the problem91 and to redis- 
cover a flawed theory leading to successive conflict disqualifica- 
tion. Although the Sixth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's 
-- 
Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff 'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). 
The circuit court's less direct rejection of appearance of impropriety as a 
reason for disqualification was undoubtedly due to Chief Judge Kaufman's 
presence. Although the case cannot be reconciled with Emle Industries, Kauf- 
man did not dissent. 
87. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
88. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) 
("[Tlhe current uncertainty over what is 'ethical' underscores . . . the wisdom 
. . . of adopting a restrained approach that focuses primarily on preserving the 
integrity of the trial process."), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). 
89. Id. at 446 (citation omitted). 
90. Although the First Circuit and parts of the Third Circuit are also east 
of the Hudson river, the phrase west of the Hudson is used to contrast the rela- 
tively small corner of the nation in which the aforementioned major doctrinal 
development took place with the direction pursued by courts outside the Sec- 
ond Circuit. 
91. The spate of successive conflict and imputed disqualification motions 
in the mid-1970s was undoubtedly related to the increased growth and entan- 
glement of the legal profession. The number of motions continues to increase 
with the growth of large firm practice. The phenomenon of very mobile law- 
yers practicing in huge law firms on behalf of powerful clients is not limited to 
New York City, although it started there. 
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patently clear definition of substantial r e la t i~nsh ip ,~~  most cir- 
cuits adopted the T.C. Theatre rule as interpreted into the 1969 
Code by Emle Industries.93 The Ninth Circuit's approach, typi- 
cal of those adopting T.C. Theatre, focuses on the "probability 
that confidences were disclosed which could be used against the 
client in later, adverse repre~entation."~~ It rejects the Second 
Circuit's requirement that issue identity be patently clear and 
instead holds that a substantial relationship exists if there is a 
strong relationship between the is~ues.~5 
Brennan 's, Inc. v. Brennan 's Restaurants 96 exemplifies the 
substantial relationship theory used by courts west of the Hud- 
son. Brennan's involved a lawyer who had previously repre- 
sented all of the parties when they had worked together in a 
family restaurant business. The business was subsequently di- 
vided into two corporations. In a suit over the right to use vari- 
92. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 
193, 208 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff H., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 996 (1978). 
93. See, e.g., EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (applying law of Eighth Circuit) (substantial relationship test satisfied 
when prior and present representation were same continuous case); Analytica, 
Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983) (substantial relation- 
ship test satisfied when attorney could have obtained confidential information 
in first representation that would be relevant in second); Trone v. Smith, 621 
F.2d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980) (substantial relationship test satisfied when a 
strong relationship exists between issues); Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Res- 
taurants, 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979) (substantial relationship test satisfied 
when possibility confidential information was obtained suggests appearance of 
impropriety); Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., 551 F.2d 539, 544 (3rd Cir. 1977) (sub- 
stantial relationship test requires possibility that attorney acquired confi- 
dences in first representation that would be relevant in second 
representation). 
The volume of successive conflict cases in the Second and Sixth Circuits, 
as compared to the rest of the country, suggests that courts decide about one- 
half of the cases under one approach to substantial relationship and one-half 
under another approach. The difference can be significant. Consider a lawyer 
who has in the past represented a client in a divorce action and is now suing 
that former client for defamation on behalf of a new client, claiming punitive 
damages. Does knowledge gained through divorce representation that the for- 
mer client often flies off the handle and says irresponsible things (a secret), or 
knowledge of net worth (a confidence), disqualify the lawyer in the defama- 
tion suit? The Second and Sixth Circuits would probably not disqualify, be- 
cause the identity between the issues involved in the divorce and defamation 
actions is not patently clear. On the other hand, courts elsewhere probably 
would disqualify because the information gained in the representation of the 
divorce action would likely be useful in the representation of the defamation 
suit. 
94. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980). 
95. Id. at 1000. 
96. 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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ous slogans associated with the original restaurant, the lawyer 
represented the defendants. When the plaintiffs moved to dis- 
qualify the lawyer, the defendants, relying on authority that 
the substantial relationship rule exists to protect  confidence^,^^ 
argued that he could not possess confidential information from 
the prior representation because joint clients cannot have confi- 
dences between them.98 
The court characterized the defendants' argument as inter- 
preting "too narrowly an attorney's duty to 'preserve the confi- 
dences and secrets of a client.' "99 The 1969 Code stated that 
the ethical confidential information rule did not depend on the 
nature or the source of the information.loO Relying on that as- 
sertion, the court claimed that Ethical Consideration 4-5's ad- 
monition not to use information acquired during the 
representation to the client's disadvantage demonstrated that 
the drafters of Canon 4 intended to protect all knowledge ac- 
quired from a client, not just confidences or secrets.lOl Having 
expanded the attorney's duty beyond a concern for confidences 
and secrets, the court disqualified the lawyer, despite his al- 
leged lack of traditionally confidential information, on what 
would have been loyalty grounds had original Canon 6 re- 
mained.lo2 Instead, the court relied on Canon 9, arguing that "a 
client would feel wronged if an opponent prevailed against him 
with the aid of an attorney who Fad] formerly represented the 
client in the same matter."lo3 This concern, according to the 
court, implicated Canon 9's principle that attorneys "should 
avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."lo4 
Similarly, most courts west of the Hudson speak as if the 
actual acquisition of confidential information is irrelevant to 
this loyalty or appearance of impropriety theory of successive 
conflicts.lo5 They abandon that position without meaningful 
97. Id. at 171 (citing Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 171,172 (quoting CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 
4 (1969)). 
100. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1969). 
101. Brennan's, 590 F.2d at 172. 
102. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 30. 
103. Brennan's, 590 F.2d at 172. 
104. Id. 
105. There have been more discussions than square holdings. See, e.g., EZ 
Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459,1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying law of 
Eighth Circuit) (attorneys disqualified although they denied knowledge of con- 
fidences); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(irrelevant whether attorney actually obtained confidential information); In re 
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analysis, however, when the successive conflict involves im- 
puted disqualification issues.1°6 In a Silver Chrysler situation- 
a lawyer moving from a firm and representing a new client 
against the former firm's client-most circuits allow the lawyer 
to rebut the presumption that she actually acquired confiden- 
tial information about the first firm's client.lo7 Although these 
courts generally adopt a loyalty-based approach in successive 
conflict cases, they switch to a confidence-based approach in im- 
puted disqualification cases. They attempt to justify this depar- 
ture from the traditional substantial relationshipirrebuttable 
presumption approach by describing it as an "e~ception"~~8 cre-
ated by the Second Circuit when it developed its "peripheral 
representation" standard in Silver Chrysler.log 
The circuits that consider Silver Chrgsler a peripheral rep- 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1341,1347 (5th Cir. 1981) (pre- 
sumption that client confidences were shared among partners was irrebut- 
table); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1980) (ethical obligations 
require disqualification regardless of actual confidential information obtained); 
Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., 551 F.2d 539,542 (3rd Cir. 1977) (attorney disqualified 
when small chance existed that confidential information was obtained); City of 
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,209 (N.D. Ohio 
1976) (attorney not disqualified when affirmative evidence showed no confi- 
dential disclosure), aff 'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. h i e d ,  435 U.S. 
996 (1978). 
106. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715,723 
(7th Cir. 1982) (presumption that attorneys in law firm share confidences in- 
sufficient to support imputed disqualification); Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 
534 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1976) (refusal to disqualify because associate had 
not actually obtained any confidential information in first representation that 
would be relevant to second representation), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). 
107. See, e.g., Freeman, 689 F.2d at 723 (presumption may be rebutted by 
clear and effective showing attorney had no knowledge of confidences and 
secrets of former firm's client); Gas-A-Tron, 534 F.2d at 1325 (presumption 
may be rebutted by showing attorney had not actually obtained any confiden- 
tial information during first representation that would be useful in second rep- 
resentation). 
The single exception may be the Eighth Circuit. In Arkansas v. Dean 
Foods Products Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979), the court stated that the "at- 
torney client relationship raises an irrefutable presumption that confidences 
were disclosed." Id. at 384 (citing Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 
602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978)). The statement, how- 
ever, is dictum, and the court relied upon previous cases in which the same 
point was also made as dictum. See Fred Weber, 566 F.2d at 608; In re Yarn 
Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976). In EZ Paintr, 
the court determined that the Eighth Circuit would follow the great weight of 
authority holding the presumption rebuttable but acknowledged that Dean 
Foods creates doubt. EZ Paintr, 746 F.2d at 1461 & n.3. 
108. Analytica, 708 F.2d at 1267. 
109. See Trone, 621 F.2d at 998 n.3; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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resentation exception use it to arrive at the same nondisqualifi- 
cation result.l1° Those circuits that adopt the exception, 
however, have not examined closely whether Silver C'hrysler's 
analytic foundation supports an exception or an entirely differ- 
ent rule. The Silver Chrylser court, unfettered by any ethical 
pronouncement of Canon 6 and unimpressed with Canon 9's ap- 
pearance of impropriety as a controlling rationale, saw succes- 
sive conflict as a confidential information problem rather than 
a loyalty problem.ll1 The added circumstance of many lawyers 
in one law firm, making it unlikely that any lawyer gained con- 
fidences from each of the firm's clients, did not present an ex- 
ception for the Silver Chrysler court. Instead, it illuminated 
the analytic error of basing the successive conflict disqualifica- 
tion on loyalty. The courts that diminish Silver C'hrysler to ex- 
ception status want to maintain the loyalty rationale for the 
successive conflict rule. They ignore the Silver Chrysler ration- 
ale that without confidences to protect, the successive conflict 
rule does not exist.l12 
110. See, e.g., Freeman, 689 F.2d at 723; Gas-A-Tron, 534 F.2d at 1325. 
111. The Silver Chrysler court explained: 
[TC Theatre and Emle Industries] and the Canons on which they are 
based are intended to protect the confidences of former clients when 
an attorney has been in a position to learn them. To apply the remedy 
when there is no realistic chance that confidences were disclosed 
would go far beyond the purpose of those decisions. 
Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
As the Second and Sixth Circuits have recognized, Silver Chrysler reduced 
the successive conflict rule to a rule protecting only against use or disclosure 
of confidences. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433,445 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(en banc) (when firm not in position to use confidential information obtained 
by partner in former representation, possible appearance of impropriety insuf- 
ficient to disqualify), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); City of 
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209-10 (N.D. 
Ohio 1976) (no disqualification of firm employing former city attorney in ab- 
sence of evidence attorney disclosed confidences obtained in former represen- 
tation of city), aff 'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977); U.S. Indus. v. Goldman, 421 
F. Supp. 7, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (no disqualification in subsequent adverse 
representation because no factual allegation attorney acquired or would use 
confidential information obtained in first representation) (citing Silver 
Ozrysler, 518 F.2d at 756-57). 
112. Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983), exem- 
plifies the use of Silver C'hrysler as an exception and demonstrates that the 
analytic difference between the loyalty approach and the confidences approach 
can be critical. In Analytica, a law firm, rather than a single lawyer, switched 
sides in successive matters. The law firm that brought an antitrust suit against 
NPD had previously represented NPD in a small stock transfer. Id. at 1265. 
The law firm offered to show that the lawyer handling the current antitrust 
matter had not received any confidential information about NPD from an- 
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F. TIME TO CHANGE IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION? THE 
RETURN OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYER 
Standard Oil and Silver Chrysler dealt with the sharing of 
confidences in the first of successive representations and found 
a way to allow rebuttal of the presumption of shared confi- 
dences. Whether the presumption of shared confidences ought 
to be rebuttable between lawyers at a firm involved in the sec- 
ond of successive representations is currently the most contro- 
versial issue in successive conflict cases. 
The Second Circuit addressed that issue in Amzstrong v. 
McA1pin,l13 a case involving a former government lawyer. In 
Amnstrong the defendants were former managers of invest- 
ment companies the SEC had investigated and placed in receiv- 
ership. The receiver, using the SEC investigation reports as a 
other lawyer within the firm who had completed the prior stock transaction. 
Id. at 1267. Rejecting this attempt, the Seventh Circuit relied on a loyalty 
analysis to hold that the presumption of shared confidences was not rebutta- 
ble. See id. The confidences approach of three earlier Seventh Circuit succes- 
sive conflict cases would have required a different result in Analytica. LaSalle 
Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983) (allowing law firm 
suing county to establish that former county lawyer who had joined firm was 
sufficiently separated from ongoing litigation to ensure against confidence 
sharing with lawyers conducting the litigation); Freeman v. Chicago Musical 
Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982) (allowing rebuttal by lawyer who 
moved to another firm and then sued client of former firm); Nova Terapeutisk 
v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (allowing rebuttal by firm 
suing former client who, along with partner who had done the client's work, 
was now with different law firm). Without analysis, the Analytica court de- 
scribed those precedents as exceptions to the rule of automatic disqualification 
in substantially related successive representations. Analytica, 708 F.2d at 1267. 
The court relied instead on Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), for the proposition that the successive con- 
flict rule was based on loyalty. It  cited Westinghouse as support for the princi- 
ple that if the substantial relationship test applies, "it is not appropriate for 
the court to inquire into whether actual confidences were disclosed." 
Analytica, 708 F.2d at 1267 (quoting Westinghouse, 588 F.2d at 224). Although 
Westinghouse used substantial relationship language, it did not involve a suc- 
cessive conflict-the only kind of conflict case for which substantial relation- 
ship analysis is relevant. Westinghouse was a true loyalty case in which one 
law firm simultaneously represented both parties in different actions. It  
should have had no applicability in Analytica. 
113. 461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated, 
625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on  other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 
(1981). Chief Judge Kaufman, part of the Armstrong en banc majority, au- 
thored the Standard Oil opinion in 1955, the seminal decision in the govern- 
ment attorney line of cases. His article, The Former Government Attornmj 
and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957), was the 
first scholarly commentary on the unique position of the former government 
lawyer. 
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foundation, sued the defendants to recover misappropriated 
funds. The defendants moved to disqualify the plaintiff's law 
firm because one of its partners had been the Assistant Direc- 
tor of Enforcement at the SEC during the investigation of the 
defendants.114 They relied on the Model Code's automatic dis- 
qualification rule which provided that if a lawyer was required 
under the Disciplinary Rules to decline or withdraw from em- 
ployment, all lawyers associated with him or his firm were dis- 
qualified from representation as well.115 The law firm 
defended by demonstrating that from the moment the partner 
joined the firm, the firm had screened him from any contact 
with the case and the lawyers prosecuting it.116 
The court conceded that the Model Code barred the former 
government lawyer from representing the plaintiff,l17 but re- 
fused to disqualify the law firm despite the Code's automatic 
disqualification rule.l18 The court allowed the firm to rebut the 
presumption that information was shared within the partner- 
ship by demonstrating that it had screened the lawyer with the 
confidential information from the law suit.119 The court based 
its decision on the adverse consequences for the litigation that 
would result from disqualification, as well as its desire to avoid 
serious delay and to reinforce "public confidence in the fairness 
of the judicial process."120 
114. Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 435. 
115. Id. at 442 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-105(D) (1969)). 
116. Id. at 442-43. 
117. Id. at 442; see CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) 
(1969) (lawyer may not accept private employment regarding a matter for 
which the lawyer had substantial responsibility as a public employee). 
118. Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 445. 
119. The court allowed rebuttal of the shared confidences presumption 
without reliance on the plaintiff's argument that the court should give special 
consideration to the government's need for good lawyers who would not later 
be denied private law careers in their field of specialty because of their go+- 
ernment service. Id. at 443. 
120. Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 446. The court elaborated: 
[Tlhis is not a case where a law firm, by use of a "Chinese wall," is 
attempting to justify representation of conflicting interests at the 
same time. 
.... 
Plisqualification . . . will have serious consequences for this liti- 
gation; separating the receiver from his counsel at this late date will 
seriously delay and impede . . . his attempt to obtain redress for de- 
fendants' alleged frauds. Under the circumstances, the possible "ap- 
pearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest 
a disqualification order". . . . 
. . . Nor do we believe. . . that a failure to disqualify. . . based on 
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The A m t r o n g  decision has the potential to undermine 
Laskey's irrebuttable presumption of shared information in the 
second of successive representations, casting doubt on the pre- 
sumption's future.121 An analysis of Laskey suggests that 
courts will apply Armstrong rather than Laskey in future suc- 
cessive conflict cases that involve second firm confidence shar- 
ing now that Laskey does not apply in first firm situations. 
When the Laskey court introduced the concept of imputed dis- 
qualification, it was explicit that the single justification for cre- 
ating an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences 
between partners was "[tlo facilitate maximum disclosure of 
relevant facts on the part of clients."122 If facilitation of consul- 
tation constitutes the sole rationale for imputed disqualification 
in successive conflict cases, courts should not treat the likeli- 
hood of information sharing in the second firm more restric- 
tively than in the first firm. 
Three variables mitigate against the possibility that Arm- 
strong will undermine Laskey's automatic imputed disqualifica- 
tion rule in the second of successive representations. First, 
because the Supreme Court has barred interlocutory appeals of 
disqualification decisions, appellate disqualification opinions 
will be rare123 and doctrinal evolution of Amzstrong is, there- 
the possible appearance of impropriety will contribute to the "public 
skepticism about lawyers". . . . [Rlather than heightening public skep- 
ticism, we believe that the restrained approach this court bas] 
adopted towards attempts to disqualify opposing counsel on ethical 
grounds avoids unnecessary and unseemly delay and reinforces public 
confidence in the fairness of the judicial process. 
Id. at 445-46 (citations omitted). 
121. Although the lawyers' infections prompting the motions to disqualify 
their law firms differed in Laskey and Armstrong-in Laskey the lawyer held 
client confidences and in Armstrong the lawyer held information about a third 
party gained through government power and process-the difference does not 
diminish the damage done to the Laskey theory. If anything, the case against 
allowing rebuttal of the presumption is stronger when the lawyer has gained 
the information through the exercise of government power. See infra text ac- 
companying note 194. 
Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983), is similar to Armstrong 
and in addition involved a private lawyer. Its discussion of whether the pre- 
sumption of confidence sharing should be rebuttable, however, occurred in dic- 
tum, thus limiting its precedential value. The decision discussed Chinese 
Walls with approval and purported to hold that the "district court erred in re- 
lying on an irrebuttable presumption to find that confidences and secrets had 
been shared." Id. at 421. The problem with the case as precedent is that it af- 
firmed the district court decision, finding that the firm had not created any 
walls and had not therefore rebutted the presumption. Id. 
122. Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824,827 (2d Cir. 1955). 
123. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (barring in- 
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fore, unlikely. Second, the 1983 Model Rules adopted Arm- 
strong's holding for former government lawyers12* and rejected 
it when the infected lawyer was formerly in private practice.125 
In the absence of appellate decisions, lower courts may instead 
give substantial weight to the Rules. Third, fascination with a 
prospective solution-the Chinese Wal1126-has claimed the at- 
tention of courts,lZ7 commentators,12* and the profession, but 
terlocutory appeals in civil disqualification matters); Flanagan v. United 
States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (barring interlocutory appeals in criminal disqualifi- 
cation matters). For a disqualification appeal to make any economic or tactical 
sense, it would have to tag along with some appealable issue for which the liti- 
gant had some hope. It seems unlikely that a party could show a litigation ef- 
fect of disqualification or a failure to disqualify that would by itself prompt an 
appeal, let alone justify a favorable decision. 
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (1983). 
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.9, 1.10 (1983). 
126. Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1986), a district 
court screening decision, is the most important former client case since 
Kol lds  prohibition on interlocutory appeals in disqualification cases. See 
supra note 123. The case involved a motion to disqualify an entire law firm 
from representing the defendants because an associate had previously repre- 
sented the plaintiffs in a "minitrial" designed to avoid the current litigation. 
Nemours, 632 F. Supp. at 428. The court examined the restriction to former 
government lawyers of a screening exception to imputed disqualification. The 
court held that despite Delaware's adoption of Rules 1.9 and 1.10, screening of 
a lawyer infected from a prior private representation may rebut the presump- 
tion of shared confidences. Id. Citing a then-unpublished opinion, subse- 
quently published as INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 635 F. Supp. 1, 5 
(E.D. Pa. 1983), the court disavowed any rational distinction between former 
government and former private lawyers: 
Once it is admitted that a Chinese Wall can rebut the presumption of 
imputed knowledge in former government attorney cases, it becomes 
difficult to insist that the presumption is irrebuttable when the . . . 
previous employment was private . . . . [SJuch a proposition would 
logically require a belief that privately employed attorneys are inher- 
ently incapable of being effectively screened, as though they were less 
trustworthy . . . than their ex-Government counterparts. 
Id. at 428 (quoting Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualifica- 
tion, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 701 (1980)). 
In concentrating on the unfairness of denying former private lawyers a 
remedy available to former government lawyers, the court overlooked the pos- 
sibility that successive conflict may not be a problem to begin with. 
127. See, e.g., EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (applying law of Eighth Circuit) (Chinese Wall must be constructed im- 
mediately upon the new firm's becoming aware of a potentially disqualifying 
conflict); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417,421 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting factors 
enabling a court to conduct a case-by-case examination of the effectiveness of 
the Chinese Wall's insulation against the flow of confidential information). 
128. See, e.g., Miller & Warren, Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for 
the Inside and Outside Counsel, 40 BUS. L.J. 631, 644 (1985) (discussing effec- 
tiveness and judicial treatment of Chinese Walls when used by in-house coun- 
sel); Riger, The Model Rules and Corporate Practice-New Ethics for a 
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diverted attention from the specific successive conflict problem 
the walls were borrowed to ~ u r e . 1 ~ ~  Sole concentration on how 
to construct Chinese Walls and what they protect against to the 
exclusion of the underlying successive conflict problem130 has 
reduced the likelihood that courts will examine the preserva- 
tion of confidences issue in a way that would eliminate the 
problem and the need for a solution. 
G. ANOTHER NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION: CODIFICATION I
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
The 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct represent 
the ABA's most recent attempt to codify the law of successive 
conflict and imputed disqualification. The Rules do no better 
than the judicial decisions, in part because they continue to re- 
Competitive Era, 17 CONN. L. REV. 729, 767 (1985) (concluding that Chinese 
Walls primarily serve the practical needs and interests of the legal profession 
and thereby dilute the ethical mandates expected of attorneys); Wine-Banks, 
Ethics of Switching Sides-II, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 516, 517-21 (1985) (allowance 
of Chinese Wall screening procedure is required by nature of modern law 
practice); Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 
U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980) (examining factors and policies used by courts to ap- 
praise effectiveness of Chinese Wall screening). 
129. The Chinese Wall-a term borrowed from Wall Street, where they 
were built to avoid insider trading problems in brokerage houses-was the 
Armstrong solution that allowed rebuttal of the presumption of shared confi- 
dences in the second firm. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir. 
1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); see also Varn, 
The Multi-Service Securities Firm and the Chinese Walk A New Look in  
Light of the Federal Securities Code, 63 NEB. L. REV. 197,211 (1984) (discussing 
reasons for building a Chinese Wall in a securities firm). The coincidence in 
timing between the legal profession's interest in Chinese Walls as a device to 
avoid ethical dilemmas and the 1986 insider trading scandal on Wall Street 
should hurry the day when screening replaces Chinese Wall as the term of art, 
demonstrating that some good comes of almost everything. 
130. Concentration on the solution, rather than the problem, has sparked 
substantial interest in the wall as a device to avoid conflict problems of many 
varieties. Courts contemplating general conflict of interest problems have re- 
flected that hope and have discussed Chinese Walls in considering the classic 
loyalty problems in simultaneous representation of opposing interests. See, 
e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th 
Cir. 1978) (Chinese Wall does not modify presumption that actual knowledge 
of one or more attorneys will be imputed to each member of firm); Fund of 
Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 229 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(attempted Chinese Wall within single law firm representing adverse clients 
in same lawsuit insufficient to prevent disqualification). The Chinese Wall, of 
course, can do nothing about a law firm's vigor in simultaneously pursuing ad- 
verse interests. Attention to the solution, without remembering the nature of 
the problem for which it was designed, will likely result in even more prece- 
dent rejecting the solution. 
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flect uncertainty and confusion about their theoretical 
foundations. 
Rule 1.9(a) adopts the T.C. meatre rule against successive 
conflicts, prohibiting a lawyer who has formerly represented a 
client from representing a new client in the same or a substan- 
tially related matter if the new client's interests are materially 
adverse to the former client's interests, unless the former client 
consents.131 The commentary to Rule 1.9(a) suggests that the 
Second Circuit's patently clear test applies in determining 
whether matters are substantially related.132 
Rule 1.9(b) recognizes that the substantial relationship test 
will not prohibit all representation in which information from a 
former client may be useful to a present ~ 1 i e n t . l ~ ~  It prohibits a 
lawyer who has formerly represented a client from using infor- 
mation relating to that representation to the disadvantage of 
the former ~ 1 i e n t . l ~ ~  The rule is a necessary corollary to Rule 
1.6, which controls the disclosure of, but not the use of, confi- 
dential inf0rmati0n.l~~ 
Rule 1.10 is the imputed disqualification rule.136 The rule 
131. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1984). See 
supra note 14. 
132. The commentary states: "The underlying question is whether the law- 
yer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be 
justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question." MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1984). 
133. Id. Rule 1.903). 
134. Id. Professor Wolfram argues that there is no need for Rule 1.9(b) in 
the Model Rules and that it only invites "curiously gratuitous, interpretative 
problems." See C. WOJ~FRAM, ODERN LEGAL ETHICS 364 (1986). His failure to 
appreciate any significance in Rule 1.9(b) is due to his misunderstanding of the 
substantial relationship test. He contends that "no doubt . . . a lawyer is dis- 
qualified from. . . any case in which the adverse use of a former client's confi- 
dential information is a likely temptation!' Id. at 365. The observation is 
certainly untrue in the Second and Sixth Circuits. See Silver Chrysler Plym- 
outh v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) (enforcing the 
lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity and guarding against the danger of use of 
confidential information does not require a blanket disqualification approach); 
City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209 
(N.D. Ohio 1977) (asserting that equity demands the presumption of disclosure 
of confidences be rebuttable), afpd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 996 (1978). Wolfram's observation is also inconsistent with the view 
expressed in the comment to Rule 1.9. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1984) (information acquired by a lawyer during 
representation may not subsequently be used by the lawyer to the disadvan- 
tage of the client). Rule 1.9(b) protects the use of confidences in a representa- 
tion against a former client that is not substantially related to the prior 
matter. 
135. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1984). 
136. Id. Rule 1.10. This Rule states: 
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applies to all lawyers and law firms, save former government 
lawyers. Rule 1.10(a) adopts the loyalty-based rule of auto- 
matic imputed disqualification, prohibiting members of a firm 
from representation when any of its lawyers are barred.137 It 
applies to all imputed disqualifications, not just successive con- 
flict cases. Rule 1.10(b) codifies the Silver Chrysler approach to 
the actual acquisition of confidential information about a client 
at the lawyer's former firm.138 A lawyer's subsequent associa- 
tion with another firm will not jeopardize the second firm's 
representation of a client with interests adverse to the joining 
lawyer's former client unless the joining lawyer actually pos- 
sesses confidential information about the former ~ 1 i e n t . l ~ ~  Fur-
ther, the confidential information must be "material."140 The 
rule also adopts the view that in successive conflict situations 
the presumption of shared confidences in the second represen- 
tation is irrebuttable.141 
Rule 1.10(c) adopts a variation of the rebuttable presump- 
tion of shared confidences. It allows a law firm that has lost 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall 
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone 
would be prohibited from doing so by rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. 
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may 
not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially re- 
lated matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer 
was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests 
are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had 
acquired information protected by rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material 
to the matter. 
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the 
firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with in- 
terests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the for- 
merly associated lawyer unless: 
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in 
which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and 
(2)  any lawyer remaining in the firm has information pro- 
tected by rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by 
the affected client under the conditions stated in rule 1.7. 
Id. 
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a) (1984); 
supra note 136; supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
138. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b) (1984); 
supra note 136; supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment 
(1984). 
140. See id. Rule l.lO(b); supra note 136. 
141. Rule 1.10(a) imputes to the entire firm the successive conflict provi- 
sions of Rule 1.9(a). Rule 1.10(b) creates an exception if the attorney moving 
between firms did not acquire material, confidential information at her prior 
firm. 
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both a client and the client's lawyer to represent an adverse in- 
terest as long as the lawyers remaining at the firm can show 
they possess none of the former client's confidential 
inf0rrnati0n.l~~ 
The commentary to Rule 1.10 is remarkable for its incon- 
sistency regarding the problem of the lawyer who moves into a 
firm with confidential information from past associations. Rule 
l.lO(b) clearly prohibits the law firm's representation, regard- 
less of whether the joining lawyer actually shares the informa- 
tion. The commentary, however, discusses the need for a 
functional analysis and defines the relevant considerations as 
"preserving confidentiality" and "avoiding positions adverse to 
a client."143 Although Rule l.lO(a) treats imputed disqualifica- 
tion of a law firm as a loyalty issue,144 everything in the com- 
mentary suggests that a confidentiality analysis is the only 
approach appropriate to the successive conflict problem in 
which a lawyer brings to a new firm confidential information 
that was gained indirectly at the former firm.145 
Rule 1.11 limits screening to rebuttal of the presumption of 
confidence sharing in the private firm of a former government 
1 a ~ y e r . l ~ ~  Screening allows the new firm to represent a party 
against the government, as well as against any private party 
about whom the former government lawyer acquired "confi- 
dential government information" while with the govern- 
ment.147 
11. A BAD MOVE IN PURSUIT OF 
AN ETHICAL ANOMALY 
The successive conflict disqualification motion is a bad 
move in pursuit of anomalous ethics that courts and the profes- 
142. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(~)(2) (1984); 
supra note 136. 
143. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1984). 
144. See id. 
145. That is, the comment suggests that the confidentiality approach ap- 
plies when the confidential information was gained not through direct repre- 
sentation at the former firm, but rather from discussion with lawyers at the 
former firm who were doing the representing. See id 
146. That is, the rule expressly allows a private firm to rebut the presump- 
tion of confidence sharing only when the lawyer possessing confidential infor- 
mation is a former government attorney. Id. Rule 1.11. There is no similar 
rule expressly allowing rebuttal of the presumption of confidence sharing by 
screening when the attorney in question was formerly associated with another 
private firm. 
147. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.ll(b) (1984). 
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sion should reevaluate. Courts have identified loyalty and a 
concern for confidences, alternatively or in combination, as the 
foundation for the successive conflict doctrine. Neither ration- 
ale supports the doctrine. Even if those concerns provide a the- 
oretical base for the successive conflict doctrine, however, the 
operation of the successive conflict rules leads to results incon- 
sistent with either rationale. 
A. SUCCESSIVE CONFLICT DISQUALIFICATION MOTIONS: A 
BAD MOVE AND WORSE RESULTS 
The law of successive conflict, as expressed in most cases 
and as detailed in the Model Rules, does not lead to results con- 
sistent with either a concern for loyalty or for the preservation 
of confidential information. The following example, though it 
combines more problems in one case than are likely to occur, 
does not exaggerate the description of individual problems or 
the nonsensical results. Suppose law firm 1 represents A Com- 
pany in a civil antitrust action against B Company, represented 
by law firm 2, and C Company, represented by law firm 3. Ear- 
lier, executives from all three companies were called to testify 
before a grand jury hearing the criminal antitrust allegations 
that now form the basis for A Company's civil suit. There was 
no grand jury indictment. 
Three years after service of the complaint in A Company's 
civil suit, Sharpe, the government lawyer who conducted the 
grand jury investigation, joins law firm 1, which is representing 
A Company. Javelin and Lance leave law firm 4, a firm that 
had been primary outside counsel for A Company before and 
during the grand jury proceedings, to join law firm 2. Javelin, a 
leveraged buyout expert, previously represented A Company in 
defending against a hostile takeover from a company in a dif- 
ferent industry. Lance, an international tax expert, had accom- 
panied a senior trial lawyer and two of A Company's executives 
to the grand jury session, at which they took the fifth amend- 
ment. Lance heard the executives tell the senior lawyer about 
a couple of the questions they anticipated, as well as the senior 
lawyer's advice to take the fifth amendment. 
Law firm 3 had been A Company's primary outside counsel 
for the year between the time that A Company left law firm 4 
and before it went to law firm 1 to bring the antitrust action. 
Foil was the partner from law firm 3 who worked directly with 
A Company and who supervised all of A Company's matters. 
During the year that law firm 3 represented A Company, the 
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parties did not raise, discuss, or investigate any antitrust 
matters. 
Each of the three law firms has over two hundred lawyers 
in New York, Chicago, and Paris. All three have elaborate 
screening procedures. Sharpe is screened by law firm 1. Lance 
goes to law firm 2's Paris office to practice international tax. 
Javelin becomes involved in law firm 2's representation of B 
Company. Foil represents C Company in the litigation. Every- 
one moves to disqualify everyone else. 
The ABA Model Rules and most courts would permit law 
firm 1 to screen the former government lawyer, Sharpe-the 
individual with the most knowledge about everyone-so that 
law firm 1 may continue in the case.148 Foil and Javelin, the 
two lawyers who previously represented A Company, may rep- 
resent C and B Companies, respectively, against A Company 
because the former and current matters are not substantially 
related-at least not under the commentary on Rule 1.9 or the 
Second Circuit's rules.149 Lance, technically privy to an incon- 
sequential confidence in a substantially related matter-the 
criminal antitrust investigation-will disqualify all of law firm 
2's lawyers. That Lance, a tax lawyer in Paris, knows almost 
nothing about A Company will not change the result. 
If loyalty provides the reason for the successive conflict 
rule, it seems strange that Javelin, the lawyer previously in- 
volved in a takeover defense for A Company, would now be 
representing B Company against A Company. If loyalty is the 
148. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.ll(b) (1984) ("A 
firm with which the [ex-government] lawyer is associated may undertake or 
continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is 
screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of 
the fee therefrom!'); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(en banc) (screening of former government attorney from participation in case 
effectively precludes use of confidential information obtained while with the 
government), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). 
149. The Second Circuit has held that a substantial relationship between 
the subject matter of a former representation and a current adverse represen- 
tation exists only when the relationship of the issues involved is "patently 
clear." Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 755 
(2d Cir. 1975); see also Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737,739-40 
(2d Cir. 1978) (disqualification granted only when issues are identical or essen- 
tially the same). The Model Rules appear to have adopted this standard. See 
supra note 132 and accompanying text. Foil and Javelin, the two lawyers who 
previously represented A Company, may represent clients adverse to A Com- 
pany because it is not patently clear that the issues in the current antitrust 
action are identical to the issues in either a leveraged buyout (Javelin) or in 
any of the nonantitrust matters handled by Foil. 
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issue, there is no way to explain how Foil, the former primary 
outside counsel and personal contact person for A Company, 
can remain in the lawsuit on behalf of C Company. If, on the 
other hand, the successive conflict rule is a prophylactic against 
the disclosure of confidences and secrets by a lawyer inclined to 
breach the prohibition against disclosure, the former govern- 
ment lawyer is the first lawyer who should disqualify a firm. 
The disqualification of law firm 2, because of the inconsequen- 
tial knowledge of a tax lawyer in Paris, is odd under any theory 
given the results for Javelin, Foil, and Sharpe. The possibility 
that the result of the motions will depend on the federal circuit 
in which the matter is venued compounds the problem, making 
reasonable predictions about choice of counsel by clients, ac- 
ceptance of cases by law firms, and choice of colleagues by law- 
yers unreasonably difficult. 
The costs to the adversary system and the profession of ob- 
taining these results-results inconsistent with any conceivable 
rationale for the successive conflict rule-are significant. The 
judiciary has made regular adverse comment, both in and out of 
court, on the costs to the judicial system in energy and im- 
age.150 The motions consume an inordinate amount of time, 
harass litigants and lawyers, and promote intense professional 
and personal bitterness. The disputes are often between law- 
yers and law firms more than between clients and lawyers. 
Our adversary system, concerned about its image within the so- 
ciety it serves, gains little from what appears as petty profes- 
sional squabbling. Worse, when a court disqualifies a firm for a 
technical conflict, the image of the profession is depreciated 
gratuitously. If the media views the matter as newsworthy, the 
public only hears conflict of interest. That the disqualification 
was because of information that an incoming lawyer had, but of 
which others were unaware, is lost. 
A single example captures the cost to the individual liti- 
gant of bringing or defending disqualification motions. In 
150. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1985) 
(discussing increase in time and expense inherent in motion for disqualifica- 
tion of counsel); Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 446 (restrained approach to disqualifi- 
cation avoids unnecessary delay and reinforces public confidence in fairness of 
judicial process); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(courts should hesitate to disqualify attorney and must carefully weigh needs 
of efficient judicial administration against effect of attorney's conduct); Van 
Graafeiland, Lawyers Conflict of Interest-A Judge's View, 50 N.Y. ST. B.J. 
101,140-41,144 (1978) (noting strategic use of disqualification motions and con- 
cluding higher quality of representation attainable with less expenditure of ju- 
dicial time than that currently consumed by motions to disqualify). 
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Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research,l51 the disqualified law firm 
was ordered to pay $25,000 in fees to NPDYs lawyers to cover 
the cost of the disqualification motion's prosecution in the trial 
co~rt.15~ The prevailing law firm's trial court claim for fees 
was $65,000.153 The likelihood that the plaintiff's fees in the 
entire T.C. Theatre matter, in which the successive conflict dis- 
qualification doctrine was invented thirty years earlier, did not 
exceed $65,000 highlights the enormity of the problem. In a 
case that might not involve a court's moderating influence in 
the fee process, $130,000 spent by two parties to determine 
whether one party has the right lawyer seems excessive-but 
not uncommon. 
The cost to clients in time, money, emotional energy, and 
confidence in the system is even more staggering when a dis- 
qualification motion is successful. The client with a disqualified 
lawyer must start again, no matter how technical the disqualifi- 
cation, and often without the benefit of the work done by the 
disqualified firm.154 The client loses not only the law firm of 
151. 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983). 
152. Id. at 1265. 
153. Id. at 1279 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
154. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 
1978) (en banc), is one of the leading cases on the issue of work product shar- 
ing between disqualified counsel and successor counsel. On rehearing en banc, 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected a per se rule denying 
successor counsel the work product of the disqualified attorney. Id. at 204-05 
(finding "no reason for an irrebuttable presumption . . . that whenever cause 
of disqualification exists any lawyer work thereafter is lost work irrespective 
of its nature"). The court noted that the penalty of unavailability of work 
product to successor counsel "is against the client. . . irrespective of any fault" 
on the client's part. Id. at 205. The court held that when an attorney has been 
disqualified, the availability of work product to successor counsel must be de- 
termined on the basis of the facts of the particular case. Id. at 202. While de- 
clining to set forth a specific rule, the apparent standard is the likely existence 
of confidential information in the attorney work product, and i n  camera in- 
spection of the material is recommended. Id. at 211 n.6 (suggesting judge 
"should be satisfied that there is no taint of confidentiality or other improper 
advantage gained" and that this determination "might well involve" an i n  
camera inspection). 
Despite First Wisconsin's ultimate determination that on its particular 
facts all work product should be turned over, id. at 211, other jurisdictions 
have relied on the First Wisconsin standard to disqualify attorney work prod- 
uct. See, e.g., EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (applying law of Eighth Circuit) (prohibiting turnover of work product 
prepared after disqualified attorneys had moved from firm representing plain- 
tiff to firm representing defendant because there was significant danger work 
product contained confidences obtained from plaintiff); Realco Servs. v. Holt, 
479 F. Supp. 867, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (pending motion for access, substitute 
counsel not permitted access to work product of attorney disqualified under 
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choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client 
has confidence. Moreover, most clients find selecting counsel 
and preparing for litigation sufficiently harrowing experiences 
that they will do almost anything to avoid them once. The sys- 
tem exacts a high price when clients have to suffer twice. 
B. ETHICS FOR THE PROFESSION, RULES FOR THE COURTS 
Relying on Canon 6, the T.C. Theatre court framed the 
original discussion of successive conflicts as an ethical issue. 
Characterization of the problem as ethical has continued 
through many cases interpreting the 1969 Model Code and the 
1983 Model Rules.155 No court has cited compelling precedent 
for the ethical jurisdiction, but courts have offered various con- 
flicting rationales, including the need to protect the rights of 
the individual client,156 and the "need to maintain the highest 
ethical standards of professional responsibility . . . [to preserve] 
the public's trust in the integrity of the Bar."157 The 1983 
Model Rules, in ironic contrast to the courts' ethical approach, 
handle the successive conflict issues from a legislative, rule- 
making perspective. Rules 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11 consider every 
possible version of lawyer movement and employment opportu- 
nity and present a precise rule-oriented response for each. 
The courts' assumption of an ethical jurisdiction and the 
substantial relationship test, because disqualified attorney may have acquired 
and used confidential information in work product) (citing First Wis. Mortgage 
Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1978)). But see Behanin v. Dow 
Chem., 642 F. Supp. 870, 874 (D. Colo. 1986) (approving release of disqualified 
attorney's work product to successor counsel when opponent failed to per- 
suade court alleged confidences were related to instant suit or could be present 
in any work product); Black v. State of Mo., 492 F. Supp. 848, 871 (W.D. Mo. 
1980) (allowing turnover of disqualified attorney's work product to soften im- 
pact of client's loss of experienced counsel's time and efforts when defendants 
failed to show specific injury). See generally Comment, The Availability of 
Work Product of a Disqualified Attorney: What Standard?, 127 U .  PA. L. 
REV. 1607, 1611 (1979) (proposing balancing test: court should deny successor 
attorney work product request only if attorney being replaced was disqualified 
due to possible use of client confidences and possibility of their use against dis- 
qualifying party outweighs harm to client of unavailable work product). 
155. The assertion of jurisdiction in Richardson v. Hamilton International 
Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973), is typical: 
"Whenever an allegation is made that an attorney has violated his moral and 
ethical responsibility . . . [i]t is the duty of the district court to examine the 
charge, since it is that court which is authorized to supervise the conduct of 
the members of its bar." Id. at 1385. 
156. See Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 
216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954). 
157. Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 565 (2d Cir. 1973). 
Heinonline - -  72 Minn. L. Rev. 264 1987-1988 
19871 SUCCESSIVE CONFLICT DISQUALIFICATION 265 
profession's rule approach to successive conflict share an error: 
each has intruded into the other's domain and used the other's 
perspective. The courts' perspective and the profession's per- 
spective could lead to the same result, but the rationales and 
analyses should differ. The successive conflict doctrine, as it 
turns out, is both bad law and bad ethics. In the development 
of successive conflict law, the confusion of both role and per- 
spective has led to a court-designed disqualification doctrine 
that has no reasonable rule analysis to support it. In the pro- 
fession's development of the ethics of conflict of interest, that 
same confusion has led to a series of conflict prohibitions that 
have no ethical foundation. The courts and the bar might have 
avoided both results had they used their appropriate 
perspectives. 
The confusion in role and perspective arose in part because 
the profession, courts, and law schools have rarely discussed 
what they mean by legal ethics. Specifically, they have not ar- 
ticulated whether legal ethics are a subset of ethics in the gen- 
eral sense or a set of rules. Ethics are permanent and 
foundational; rules, transitory and relational. Ethics are about 
values and being. Rules are developed to work out relation- 
ships within a society. Ethics are introspective. Rules define 
how individuals or groups may conduct themselves in light of 
the rights and needs of other individuals and groups. The sta- 
tus of an assertion as ethic or rule thus depends on the reason 
for its existence and the consequence of its adoption, rather 
than on its substance. For example, "Thou shalt not steal," 
found in the Ten Commandments, is ethical. As a moral imper- 
ative, it was promulgated for the purpose of, and is expected to 
have the consequence of, increasing the holiness, the worth, or 
the value of the believer. "Intentional taking without claim of 
right," found in a statute, is a rule. As a description of legal re- 
lationship and behavior, it was formulated for the purpose of, 
and is expected to have the consequence of, maintaining the 
value or worth to the possessor of what it is that should not be 
taken. Deciding whether legal ethics are ethics or rules is im- 
portant because each is entitled to different consideration by 
those promulgating and interpreting them. 
The ABA's successive attempts to describe, through the 
promulgation of legal ethics, how lawyers are (ethics) or how 
they should act (rules) exemplify the profession's intellectual 
ambivalence about the nature of legal ethics. The ABA's 1908 
Canons of Ethics were as close to classical ethics-a system of 
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moral principles or ~a lues l~~-as  the bar ever ventured. The 
profession adopted the Canons for the same reason that most 
ethical constructs are developed: to define and separate a group 
of adherents from the rest of society. The Canons provided a 
professional separation that allowed for an important, privi- 
leged role in a larger society and at the same time forestalled 
societal regulation. 
The ethics label for the 1908 Canons was not a matter of 
accident. It reflected accurately the perspective of the promul- 
gators.lS9 The three quotations placed before the preamble for 
the specific purpose of establishing the moral base for the en- 
deavor demonstrate the profession's 1908 view that the Canons 
of Ethics were the lawyers' equivalent of the Ten 
Commandments: 
There is . . . no profession in which so many temptations beset the 
path to swerve from the line of strict integrity . . . . 
High moral principle is the only safe guide, the only torch to light 
[the lawyer's] way amidst darkness and obstruction.-George 
Sharswood 
Craft is the vice, not the spirit, of the profession. . . . Truth and 
integrity can do more in the profession than the . . . wiliest devices.- 
Edward G. Ryan 
A moral tone ought to be enforced in the profession which would 
drive such men [those who stir up litigation] out of it.-Abraham 
~incoln'~O 
In contrast, the ABA's 1969 Code of Professional Responsi- 
bility had a different tone. The title itself, using "Code" rather 
than "Canons" and "Professional Responsibility" rather than 
"Ethics," suggested a greater rule orientation. The 1969 Code 
retained the ecclesiastical "canon" designation for only one of 
three divisions within its overall concern for professional re- 
sponsibility and trifurcated its focus to encompass axiomatic 
norms, ethical objectives, and mandatory rules.161 
158. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 242 (2d ed. 1983). 
159. David Hoffman, the father of legal ethics in the United States, was the 
source for the Canons through the writings of his successors and the state 
codes based on his resolutions. See Armstrong, A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 
A.B.A. J. 1063, 1064 (1978). According to Professor Shaffer, Hoffman wrote 
"of justice as classical [ethicists] often [do], as a matter of personal morals and 
as a habit or virtue." T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, 
AND DISCUSSION TOPICS 68 (1985). 
160. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS at 4 (1908). 
161. The Code is designed . . . as an inspirational guide . . . and as a 
basis for disciplinary action . . . . 
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms . . . . 
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and rep- 
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States enforce their adopted versions of the ABAYs formu- 
lations of legal ethics through disciplinary systems developed 
for that specific purpose. In most jurisdictions the state's high- 
est court acts as the final tribunal within that disciplinary sys- 
tem. As a result, in legal ethics, courts have a dual role 
involving both the inward-looking ethic that defines the profes- 
sion and the outward-looking rule that affects others and the 
adversary system within which lawyers work. 
The court's jurisdiction and therefore its proper perspec- 
tive when asked to consider disciplinary matters parallels the 
profession's perspective; it is ethic-oriented, concerned with the 
nature and image of the profession as a self-defined and self- 
regulated part of society. Its decisions in that role properly per- 
petuate the profession as a separate societal group defined by 
its special obligations and privileges. 
On the other hand, the court's jurisdiction and therefore its 
proper perspective when asked to resolve a substantive dispute 
about lawyer conduct is rule-oriented. The nature and image of 
the profession are irrelevant to this j u r i s d i c t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  The court as 
substantive arbiter between the litigants has no interest in 
either the profession's ethics or in whether a particular lawyer 
adheres to those ethics, unless the questioned conduct affects 
the rule value of a particular legal-ethics formulation, thereby 
resent the objectives toward which every member of the profession 
should strive. . . . 
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are 
mandatory in character. 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (Final Draft 
1969). 
162. The Armstrong court rejected the familiar assertion that the bar and 
the adversary system are inextricably intertwined in image and effectiveness. 
See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 443, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), va- 
cated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). In denying that public disregard 
for the bar was the equivalent of lost credibility for the adversary system, it 
distinguished ethics from adversary propriety and adopted a disqualification 
standard requiring that the conflict taint the underlying trial: 
We recognize that a rule that concentrates on the threat of taint fails 
to correct all possible ethical conflicts. . . . PN]e do not denigrate the 
importance of ethical conduct by attorneys practicing in this court- 
house . . . . Nowever, absent a threat of taint to the trial . . . ethical 
conflicts . . . are . . . better addressed by the "comprehensive discipli- 
nary machinery" of the state and federal bar or possibly by 
legislation. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
In a less lawyerly but equally compelling sense, the adversary system has 
worked relatively well for years, although lawyers as a group have been re- 
garded as somewhere between used car dealers and felons in society's 
estimation. 
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affecting the functioning of the adversary system. The court 
must, however, base its analysis and enforcement on the rule 
interest, not on the broader, profession-based ethics interest. 
The Second Circuit has adopted this result, if not the entire 
ethics-versus-rules analysis. Both W.T. Grant Co. v. H a i n e ~ l ~ ~  
and Board of Education v. disavowed any jurisdic- 
tion to vindicate the profession's ethical concerns. In rejecting 
the paternal view, the Grant court was concerned only about 
the effect of the ethical violation on the specific trial: "The 
business of the court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as 
a general overseer of the ethics of those who practice here un- 
less the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause before 
it."165 Similarly, the Nyquist court, admitting that its power to 
disqualify lawyers in pending litigation had long been assumed, 
but never discussed,166 limited its authority to disqualify to the 
interest for which it had traditional jurisdiction-the general 
functioning of the adversary system. The court explained that 
its review of Second Circuit cases suggested that the power to 
disqualify counsel was used "where necessary to preserve the 
integrity of the adversary process."167 
This analysis, distinguishing between rules and ethics when 
delineating courts' jurisdiction and thus proper perspective, not 
only narrows courts' jurisdiction to consider ethical issues, but 
also restricts courts' analytic method. Arguments based on 
rules of relation require functional analysis, whereas argu- 
ments based on ethics do not because the value to be preserved 
does not depend on its relationship to something else. Without 
an ethical jurisdiction, courts cannot support decisions by rely- 
ing on the per se rectitude of an ethical tenet in the place of 
analysis. Specifically, they may no longer rely on the inherent 
strength of loyalty, moral responsibility, and the appearance of 
impropriety to avoid rigorous cause and effect analysis. The ad- 
vocate's fidelity will not matter unless the failure to disqualify 
will result in the corruption of the adversary process. The ap- 
pearance of impropriety will matter only upon demonstration 
that appearance will systematically affect the quality of deci- 
sion making in the system. A concern for confidences will sup- 
port disqualification only upon a showing that a contrary rule 
163. 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976). 
164. 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979). 
165. Grant, 531 F.2d at  677 (emphasis added). 
166. Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1245-46. 
167. Id. at  1246 (emphasis added). 
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will diminish regularly the quality of justice. This rule- 
oriented approach to the courts' appropriate rhetoric thus 
forces them to use a functional analysis in deciding whether to 
disqualify in successive conflict cases. 
Just as the rules perspective is important for the courts, 
the ethical perspective is important for the profession. The 
profession should hesitate to incorporate rule analysis for fear 
that it will replace valid ethical considerations, just as courts 
should hesitate to consider the ethical perspective for fear that 
it will override their rule perspective. In adopting the 1983 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA did just the op- 
posite. The Model Rules are as far from the Canons of Ethics 
as their nomenclature implies. Although the Model Rules pur- 
port to have a relationship to the ethical practice of law, they 
are designed more to tell lawyers what to do (rules) rather 
than how to be (ethics): 
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should 
be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation 
and of the law itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the 
terms "shall" or "shall not." These define proper conduct for pur- 
poses of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term 
"may," are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the 
lawyer has professional discretion.168 
As a result of this perspective, the Model Rules handle the suc- 
cessive conflict issue as if the profession were the keeper of the 
adversary system, designing rules for mechanical application. 
The profession, therefore, did no better with ethics than the 
courts did with rules. 
Courts that view successive conflict from the perspective of 
an effective adversary system of dispute resolution will prohibit 
the motion because it provides nothing positive for the adver- 
sary system and causes significant harm.169 The three theories 
offered by various courts to support disqualification-appear- 
ance of impropriety,170 loyalty,171 and preservation of confi- 
den~es17~--do not support an adversary system interest in a 
litigant's status as former client. 
168. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1984). 
169. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
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The appearance of impropriety theory, which first ap- 
peared in the cases as a matter of ethics, was rejected as an eth- 
ical tenet in the Model Rules. Canon 9 was dropped entirely. 
The commentary to Rule 1.10 explains that the concept of im- 
propriety is hopelessly dependent cin the subjective views of 
anxious clients, as well as "question begging" because impro- 
priety is not defined in the subsequent representation con- 
text.173 Courts and commentators also have rejected the 
appearance of impropriety theory as even less useful in making 
adversary system judgments.174 
Despite the round rejection of an appearances theory, the 
adversary system does have a legitimate interest in how it ap- 
pears to the public. The system's continuation depends on pub- 
lic acceptance. That image, however, is not coextensive with 
the image of the legal profession. The Second Circuit distin- 
guished ethics from adversary propriety in rejecting the famil- 
iar assertion that disregard for the bar was the equivalent of 
lost credibility for the adversary system.175 Society's continuing 
low esteem for lawyers and its increasing reliance on the adver- 
sary system to correct all ills provide some support for the Sec- 
ond Circuit's view. If the adversary system's image is relevant, 
courts arguably should never hear successive conflict disqualifi- 
cation motions. These often visible motions, charging unethical 
conduct, bring matters to public attention that would otherwise 
escape notice. Further, the motions ask courts to help clients 
keep secrets, something that in most contexts the public consid- 
ers distasteful. Whatever force the appearance of impropriety 
theory might have had for the 1969 Model Code, it offers no 
support for an adversary system rule against successive conflict. 
The contention that successive conflict damages the adver- 
sary system is more troublesome when based on the ethical im- 
perative of loyalty. The surrogate's single-mindedness in 
pursuit of the client's interest is a proposition so essential to 
the adversary system that it seems superfluous to ask courts to 
test it. The popular use of the term successive concfZict suggests 
that the lawyer representing an adverse interest against a for- 
173. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1984). 
174. See, e.g., Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A 
Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 
243, 264-65 (1980). 
175. See Armstrong v .  McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (en 
banc) (suggesting that those conflicts that do not threaten adversary system 
are better lef t  to bar's disciplinary machinery or legislation), vacated on other 
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). 
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mer client has a problem of divided loyalty. This is not true. 
Successive conflict doctrine confuses the surrogate's loyalty ob- 
ligation with the obligation to vigorously represent a current 
client. The dispute resolution system's interest in loyalty is 
limited to assurance that lawyers will vigorously represent the 
positions of opposing parties, thereby fulfilling the system's ad- 
versary assumption. 
A successive conflict, unlike the various forms of concur- 
rent conflict, does not present a situation in which the com- 
plaining former client has any concern for the vigor of the 
lawyer's representztion of the current client. If a loyalty prob- 
lem exists in successive client cases, it is ironically the current 
client who may have cause for concern about the lawyer's vigor. 
One can imagine situations in which the lawyer might prose- 
cute the current matter less vigorously so that the former cli- 
ent will return. Even more likely, the lawyer has confidences 
from the former client that the lawyer may not, as a result of 
the privilege and the confidential information rules, use in the 
current matter on behalf of the current client. The lawyer's 
appropriate concern for the duty not to use or disclose those 
confidences, or for avoiding later accusations of having done so, 
might restrict the lawyer's pursuit of discovery or vigorous 
prosecution of the matter for the current client. Courts have 
never recognized the current client's possible concerns, how- 
ever, probably because the moving party in successive conflict 
cases-the former client-has no standing to complain about 
the vigor of the opponent's ~ounse1. l~~ As long as the current 
client has knowledge of the lawyer's potential handicap, the ad- 
176. The consultation and consent requirement of Model Rule 1.7 prohibits 
a lawyer from accepting a subsequent representation against a former client 
without disclosing to the current client that the representation might be af- 
fected by the lawyer's obligation not to use or disclose the former client's con- 
fidential information. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 
(1984). Concern for ensuring the lawyer's single-mindedness assumed by the 
adversary system may justify a court rule similar to Rule 1.7(b)(2). See infra 
notes 204-05, 208 and accompanying text (proposing such a rule). Should 
courts decide that the risk of noncompliance with 1.7(b)(2) is substantial, or, in 
Code jurisdictions, that the matter is not covered under Canon 5, a rule that 
would allow a former client to make a disqualification motion would be justi- 
fied, as long as proof of consultation and consent would dispose of the matter 
in favor of the subsequent representation. If such a rule existed, one would 
expect lawyers to adopt a rather complete disclosure document that would 
both inform the prospective client without divulging confidences and provide a 
one-document response that would make the disqualification procedure short 
and cheap. 
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versary system has no loyalty interest to pursue in successive 
conflict situations. 
The only true adversary system concern in subsequent rep- 
resentation situations is confidentiality. Courts mischaracterize 
- 
that concern, however, when they discuss preservation of confi- 
dences as either an ethical issue177 or as a problem of protecting 
the client's right to privacy.178 Rather, the modern theory of 
confidences relates directly to the operation of the adversary 
system. The modern theory holds that unless a client believes 
that lawyers will keep confidences, the client will not be free of 
apprehension and consequently will not consult adequately 
with the lawyer, thereby preventing the lawyer from acting 
effe~tive1y.l~~ 
Despite regular reference to this freedom of apprehension 
theory of confidential information, courts act as if the former 
client's secrets had an intrinsic value that they must protect, as 
demonstrated by their continuing distinction between use and 
disclosure of confidences. When the possibility of unconscious 
use of confidences is high, courts find a way to disqualify.lS0 
When the use of confidences would require disclosure from one 
lawyer to another, courts are more likely to avoid disqualifica- 
tion.lsl This suggests that courts continue to believe mistak- 
enly that the danger of actual use of confidences at trial, rather 
than the facilitation of client disclosure, constitutes the real ad- 
versary system concern.ls2 
Courts' concern for the actual use of confidential informa- 
177. See, e.g., Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(when attorney might have acquired confidential information, attorney is dis- 
qualified; "[nlowhere is Shakespeare's observation that 'there is nothing either 
good or bad but thinking makes it so' more apt than in the realm of ethical 
considerations"). 
178. See, e.g., Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management 
Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954) (requiring assurance of the confidence 
inherent in the client-attorney relationship for the public good). 
179. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
180. See, e.g., Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, 590 F.2d 168, 172 
(5th Cir. 1979); Emle Industries, 478 F.2d at 571; T.C. Theatre v. Warner Bros. 
Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
181. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 723 
(7th Cir. 1982); Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. 
Supp. 581, 588-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff 'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). 
182. Indeed, the Silver Chrysler court's observation that the use of confi- 
dences later in the case and after the motion might justify disqualification sup- 
ports the suggestion that some courts worry, at least unconsciously, about the 
actual use of confidential information, rather than about clients' apprehension 
concerning that use. See Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 758. 
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tion is not appropriate, however, in vindicating the adversary 
system's interest in confidentiality. The system has recognized 
no value in secret keeping since the 1700s.lS3 Even then, the 
client's confidence or secret had no intrinsic or proprietary 
value; only the honor of the secret-keeper mattered. Confi- 
dences differ from trade secrets, for example, which do have in- 
strinsic value because individuals work to create them and a 
protectable proprietary interest is therefore recognized. Despite 
occasional discussion to the contray,18* the adversary system 
has no case-specific interest in a client's right to keep confiden- 
tial information from influencing the outcome of a matter.ls5 If 
the client's confidential information from the first representa- 
tion affects the result when used in the second, either directly 
or as the key to discovery of other information, the adversary 
system has reached a decision closer to the truth. The client 
whose confidential information has been used or divulged, 
although unhappy, has not been deprived of either an accurate 
or a fair result. Because confidentiality lacks intrinsic value, 
courts misidentify the system's interest in confidences when 
they assign, implicitly or explicitly, a value to the actual use of 
confidences in successive conflict disqualification situations. 
At most, the adversary system tolerates secret keeping 
only in the interest of the client's freedom of apprehension, an 
objective the system pursues on the assumption that it makes 
the system work better. The adversary system is built on the 
assumptions that the surrogate can do better than the client in 
the adversary system and that for the surrogate to do better, 
- - - 
183. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
184. The assertion that one of the reasons for protecting the confidentiality 
of communications "is to ensure fundamental fairness by prohibiting the use 
of confidences . . . against that client's interests" is typical. Note, Attorney's 
Conftict of Interests: Rqresentation of Interest Adverse to mat of Former CZi- 
ent, 55 B.U.L. REV. 61,64 (1975). No theoretical or case authority supports the 
proposition that fairness and confidences have any relation to each other. 
185. Confidences contrast directly to loyalty regarding whether the adver- 
sary system has an interest in the client's right to keep information from in- 
fluencing the case's outcome. Courts do have a case-specific interest in the 
vigor of representation. While truth in a specific case increases as the amount 
of information unavailable because of confidentiality decreases, less vigorous 
representation can contribute to a wrong result. The Nyquist court identified 
loyalty as the case-specific interest that might cause disqualification. See 
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979). Although the 
court rejected a claim that the particular union lawyer should be disqualified 
because some of the opponents were other union members whose dues paid 
the lawyer, it recognized that certain conflicts could raise questions about the 
vigor of representation and thereby "taint the trial." Id. 
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the surrogate must be fully informed--even about things harm- 
ful and embarrassing to the client. The system facilitates the 
transfer of knowledge to the surrogate by freeing the client 
from all fear that the surrogate will use or allow others to use 
the information against the client. Even the cases that search 
for a loyalty or appearance of impropriety base for successive 
conflict disqualification accept the client's freedom of appre- 
hension as the underlying rationale.186 
Although many have thought that the world could resolve 
disputes without l a~ye r s , l 8~  and that the adversary system 
could do without confidences,188 we need not throw either law- 
yers or confidential information out of the adversary system to 
186. See, e.g., Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,570 (2d Cir. 1973). 
187. The best of history's lawyer bashing is collected in Post, On the Popu- 
lar Image of the Lawyer: Refections i n  a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 379 
(1987). Shakespeare's infamous advice, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the 
lawyers," W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, Part 11, act 4, scene 2, line 86, is only 
the best known, if the least understood, of history's disparagement of lawyers. 
Indeed, many others have shared Shakespeare's sentiment. For example, 
Thomas More needed no lawyers in Utopia. He stated: 
They have no lawyers among them, for they consider them a sort of 
people, whose profession it is to disguise matters, as well as to wrest 
laws; and therefore they think it is much better that every man 
should plead his own cause, and trust it to the judge, as well as in 
other places the client does it to a counsellor. By this means they 
both cut off many delays, and find out truth more certainly: for after 
the parties have laid open the merits of their cause, without those ar- 
tifices which lawyers are apt to suggest, the judge examines the whole 
matter, and supports the simplicity of such well-meaning persons, 
whom otherwise crafty men would be sure to run down . . . . 
T. MORE, UTOPIA 150 (London 1845) (1516). St. Luke was certain that lawyers 
added, rather than lessened man's burdens. "Woe to you lawyers also! For 
you load man with burdens hard to bear, and you yourselves do not touch the 
burdens with one of your fingers." Luke 11:46 (Revised Standard Version). 
Ben Franklin's Poor Richard was no kinder: "Necessity has no Law. I know 
some Attorneys of the name." B. FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANAC 36 
(New York 1849) (1734). Neither was H.L. Mencken inclined to view lawyers 
favorably: "A peasant between two lawyers is like a fish between two cats." 
H. MENCKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 
FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN SOURCES 669 (1942) (quoting a Spanish proverb). 
188. Jeremy Bentham thought the idea of confidences substantially more 
harmful than helpful to the adversary system. See 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE 
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 300-12 (1827). 
Arguably, the rule of confidentiality adds nothing to the quality or accept- 
ability of the adversary system's result. First, in a world of extensive discov- 
ery, clients are no longer the major source of lawyers' information. Second, 
confidential information not used in court (if used, such information is no 
longer confidential) rarely adds to the advocate's affirmative preparation or to 
the information the advocate can bring to the fact finder. Third, the client 
does not need the shield of confidences as an incentive to tell the lawyer some- 
thing that is truly important to the matter at hand. Finally, if, as a result of 
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demonstrate that use or disclosure of confidential information 
provides no reason for a successive conflict rule. Bearing in 
mind the basic assumptions of the adversary system, two ques- 
tions should be answered to determine whether the successive 
conflict rule is needed. Does a rule against successive conflicts 
meaningfully affect the frequency or completeness of client dis- 
closure to lawyers? If the answer is yes, is the effect enough to 
justify the harm that the disqualification of lawyers brings to 
the system? If the answer to either question is no, there is no 
adversary system reason to maintain a successive conflict dis- 
qualification rule. 
Courts have regularly disqualified lawyers on the assurnp- 
tion that the answer to both questions is yes. They conclude 
without demonstration that if clients believe that lawyers later 
use their confidences against them in substantially related mat- 
ters, clients will not disclose confidences to lawyers.lS9 The 
conclusion requires an assumption that clients are aware of the 
possibility of subsequent adverse representation and actually 
consider it in deciding whether to disclose confidences to their 
lawyers. Further, the conclusion requires the assumption that 
clients do not know about the rules against use and disclosure 
of confidences or do not believe that lawyers will follow those 
rules. There are no systematic studies, but anecdotal evidence 
from lawyers undermines both assumptions and suggests that 
the conclusion is wrong. 
Common sense and logic also undermine the courts' con- 
clusion about client apprehension in the successive conflict con- 
text. Situated far from the practice of law and the memory of 
how clients think, most courts are not well positioned to specu- 
late about what clients know or do. Clients do not arrive in 
lawyers' offices thinking about future matters, let alone future 
less information from clients, all lawyers prepare less, courts' decisions will be 
neither better nor different. 
189. See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 
F.2d 250,252 (5th Cir. 1977) (asserting that in order to aid frank exchange be- 
tween attorney and client, "it is necessary to preclude . . . [the] possibility that 
information given in confidence . . . will ever be used without [the] client's 
consent"); In  re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 90 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (asserting that attorney conflict of interest rules are "designed to al- 
lay any apprehension client may have in frank discussion of confidential infor- 
mation with his attorney"); Emle Industries, 478 F.2d at 570 (asserting that 
without strict enforcement of a lawyer's obligation not to divulge client confi- 
dences, "a client would hardly be inclined to discuss his problems freely and in 
depth with his lawyer, for he would justifiably fear that information he 
reveals. . . on one day may be used against him on the next"). 
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matters in which their about-to-be-hired lawyer might oppose 
them. Most clients visit a lawyer's office because they are con- 
cerned, if not obsessed, with a present matter. Even if a client 
arrived with a concern about a future matter in which the law- 
yer would be on the other side, the client probably does not 
have the legal knowledge to ask the next important question: 
whether the future matter and the present problem will be 
substantially related.lgO The attorney-client privilege law and 
the ethics rules that require the keeping of confidences, on the 
other hand, are something that clients know about.191 Most 
lawyers rehearse those matters with every client early in the 
relationship. 
Furthermore, in describing the presumed client apprehen- 
sion, courts often speak as if without disqualification, lawyers 
will in fact use or disclose confidences,lg2 a questionable as- 
sumption on which to base disqualification decisions. The as- 
sumption of illegal and unethical conduct is a significant 
admission upon which to build a prophylactic rule, an admis- 
sion that courts should avoid without substantial evidence. No 
data or anecdotal commentary currently exists to suggest that 
lawyers do use or disclose confidences in violation of existing 
rules against doing so. If lawyers do in fact regularly use and 
disclose confidences in violation of the attorney-client privilege 
and confidential information rules, courts and the profession 
have a problem much larger than successive conflict. Moreover, 
the freedom of apprehension theory supporting the successive 
190. A client who can take the  analysis far enough t o  be concerned about 
whether a lawyer not yet hired for a present case might later oppose her in a 
yet unknown, substantially related matter knows enough law t o  make reason- 
able judgments about confidences. 
191. There is some question as t o  whether the  privilege and the  ethical 
prohibitions actually encourage disclosure o f  confidential information by  cli- 
ents t o  lawyers. T h e  following body o f  literature emphasizes that the  actual 
affect of  the  rules on disclosure is speculative and cannot be scientifically 
proven. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in 
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 112 (1956); Saltzburg, Corporate At- 
torney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner 
Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 822 (1984); Note, Functional Overlap Be- 
tween the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged 
Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1236 (1962). 
192. See, e.g., Industrial Parts Distrib. v. Fram Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1194, 
1197 (D. Kan. 1981) ("The mere possibility that privileged information could 
be used against the  former client's interest is enough to require disqualifica- 
tion."); Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1973) (re- 
quiring a "strict prophylactic rule t o  prevent any possibility . . . that 
confidential information . . . may subsequently be used t o  the  [former] client's 
disadvantage"). 
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conflict disqualification rule does not focus on the actual danger 
of use or disclosure by a lawyer, but rather on the client's fear 
of those dangers. Thus, the courts' assumption regarding client 
apprehension and consequent nondisclosure to lawyers, based 
as it is on faulty notions about client knowledge and lawyer be- 
havior, lacks sufficient substance to support disqualification. 
Even if the courts' questionable assumption of the all- 
knowing, apprehensive client is true, it is nevertheless unlikely 
that clients would disclose less in the absence of a rule against 
subsequent adverse representation. If, because of mistrust of a 
particular lawyer, the client thought future use of confidential 
information would be a problem, the client would probably hire 
someone else. If the client thought the risk of future use was 
the same with all lawyers, the client might be apprehensive 
about disclosing confidences. If, however, the client is as ra- 
tional as courts assume, the apprehension would probably not 
diminish the client's disclosure. To disclose less than whatever 
amount the client's general level of confidence would otherwise 
allow, the client would have to conclude that the information 
was less helpful to success in the current matter than it would 
be harmful in some future, hypothetical matter in which the 
client was unable to hire the same lawyer. It is hard to imagine 
a situation in which a rational client would not choose the bird 
in the hand-particularly when the bush, let alone the extra 
bird, is in doubt. 
For those clients who would, however, choose to protect 
the future, hypothetical lawsuit, the adversary system does not 
have sufficient interest in client disclosure of confidences to 
maintain a successive conflict rule that entices the super- 
rational client to disclose more in the current matter. After all, 
the client, not the system, must live with the decision between 
use now and potential harm later. The system has no stake in 
the secret itself193 and thus has no reason to interfere with how 
much information the client wants the lawyer to use. It is the 
client who must decide how much disclosure will maximize the 
potential for victory in the current matter. The system should 
not have more interest in this choice than does the client! 
One argument made in support of the confidential informa- 
tion rules is that the client does not know enough about the rel- 
evance or importance of embarassing information to make a 
reasonable judgment about whether to disclose it. Three rea- 
sons suggest that this argument does not support a successive 
193. See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text. 
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conflict rule that only marginally encourages disclosure. First, 
clients rarely know so little. Many of the critical issues are fac- 
tual, and most clients, like most juries, have at least as good a 
sense about facts as lawyers do. The rational client who knows 
enough to worry about a potential successive conflict while dis- 
cussing a current problem probably knows enough to make an 
informed judgment about confidences. Second, clients do not 
usually disgorge information in an unstructured fashion. A cli- 
ent responds to a lawyer's questions--questions based on the 
lawyer's understanding of legal relevance and importance. As a 
result, the client usually knows what areas of inquiry are im- 
portant and what information the lawyer wants. Certainly, a 
client who decides not to disclose, after the lawyer explains the 
ramifications, can make a valid judgment about present and fu- 
ture interests. Finally, the conclusion that a client will with- 
hold information in the current suit to protect against potential 
harm in a hypothetical future suit assumes that the client 
knows enough about the two situations to make a comparison 
that will result in a judgment not to disclose. The client's abil- 
ity to make that comparison is doubtful, however, because the 
client does not even anticipate a future suit, let alone know its 
nature. 
Ironically, in the one context that might justify a successive 
conflict rule-the former government lawyer situation-the 
Code liberalized the restrictions on subsequent representations 
against a former client.lg4 The revolving door of government 
service might, consistent with an adversary system perspective, 
support a rule against successive conflict because a government 
lawyer anticipating private practice is uniquely situated to sug- 
gest, review, criticize, and enforce legislation and rules in a way 
that would affect future employment. Worse, a government 
lawyer has the opportunity to use government power to obtain 
information about investigation targets for future use in private 
practice. A loyalty concern for the vigor of the first representa- 
tion, combined with a cynical view of the transitory govern- 
ment lawyer, might lead to a successive conflict rule as the only 
way to avoid the risks to the government and to innocent third 
parties inherent in the revolving door situation. 
There is, however, too little evidence of revolving door mis- 
conduct for courts to consider seriously a different successive 
194. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil, 136 F. Supp. 345, 365-66 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1980) (en 
banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). 
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conflict rule for government lawyers based on a concern for 
loyalty. Further, the issues raised by the revolving door more 
appropriately belong to a legislature worried about the quality 
of government lawyers than to a court concerned about the 
vigor of current representation. The analytic point, however, is 
important. The adversary system's interest in loyalty, in con- 
trast to its concern for preservation of confidences, might jus- 
tify a special rule that prohibits subsequent representation by 
former government lawyers or their firms against the govern- 
ment or against third parties about whom the former govern- 
ment lawyer gained knowledge while with the government. 
Finally, screening an identifiable infected lawyer, govern- 
ment or private, is a poor solution to both the loyalty conflict 
and the confidences problem. Screening has nothing to do with 
loyalty. The loyalty problem concerns the lawyer's lack of 
vigor while with the government. Screening has no effect on 
what the lawyer does while with the government because it oc- 
curs during subsequent employment. Screening also is not a 
prophylactic. Unlike disqualification, it does not create a bar- 
rier that makes the prohibited conduct impossible. If courts as- 
sume the precondition for screening-that a lawyer aware of a 
confidence and the rule against disclosure will nevertheless dis- 
close it-they should not conclude that screens will be effective. 
Office procedures designed to inhibit unintentional disclosure 
of confidential information will have no deterrent effect on 
willful disclosure. 
The successive conflict disqualification doctrine lacks ana- 
lytic support and real world justification. Confidences, to the 
extent they facilitate operation of the adversary system, are an 
appropriate concern for courts. Courts should not, however, 
disqualify lawyers without demonstrating that systematic dis- 
qualification will affect the ability of other lawyers to prepare 
adequately in the future.lS5 Even if courts assume that the suc- 
cessive conflict rule has some marginal salutary effect in facili- 
tating a client's consultation with a lawyer, the costs to the 
system and to individuals are disproportionately large. The 
time and energy consumed, the delay in the courts, the mone- 
tary costs to clients, the rule's documented potential for abuse 
195. Courts have said that systematic disqualification affects how future 
clients will act, but there is no evidence supporting this assertion. Common 
sense suggests that the successive conflict disqualification doctrine has no ef- 
fect on disclosure and, therefore, no effect on the lawyer's ability to represent 
a client. See s u m  text accompanying notes 189-91. 
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by lawyers, the added fuel that the motion brings to an already 
overheated adversary system, and the possible devastating ef- 
fect on the client's ability to continue with the litigation out- 
weigh any positive effect of the successive conflict rule. A 
disqualification motion based on successive conflict is a bad 
move that courts should not tolerate. It helps neither the client 
nor the image of the adversary system. If courts will stay away 
from lawyers' ethics and concentrate instead on the adversary 
system, they will help the system, clients, and probably 
lawyers. 
In assessing the desirability of a successive conflict rule, 
the profession should stick to its appropriate perspective, an 
ethics perspective. If the legal ethics process is not a matter of 
self-definition for the profession's own sake, if it merely estab- 
lishes relational rules for lawyers in view of the interests of cli- 
ents, lawyers have no right to control the process.lg6 They add 
little expertise, and in addition, as one of the parties to whom 
the rules apply, they carry the burden of self-interest. 
The profession's adoption in the Model Rules of the Second 
Circuit's view of subsequent representations was rule oriented 
and ethics blind. Because the product is indistinguishable from 
what a legislature might create, it is subject to criticism as rules 
and as ethics. 
Three aspects of the Model Rules treatment of the succes- 
sive conflict problem demonstrate why the profession's rule 
perspective has led to ridiculous rules and to absolutely terrible 
ethics. First, the Model Rules allow screening of former gov- 
ernment lawyers but not other lawyers. The stated rationales 
for that rule-lawyer mobility and the availability of good law- 
yers for government service-apply equally to private practice 
and thus are not persuasive. As an ethical matter, however, a 
rule that distinguishes government from private lawyers is not 
only unjustified but repugnant. Indeed, the only possible ethi- 
cal explanation for the difference is that former government 
- - - - -- -- - - 
196. The organized bar has unwisely rejected this perspective for the gen- 
eral legal ethics process. The profession will achieve the best result on the 
successive conflict issue, however, if it focuses on how lawyers should be, 
rather than on what they should do. 
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lawyers are less likely to divulge confidences than private law- 
yers. Neither logic nor history supports such an explanation. 
Second, the difference in the rebuttability of the presump- 
tion of shared confidences, depending on whether the situation 
involves the first or the second firm, is merely an absurd court 
rule. It is, however, an ethical insult. To adequately represent 
a client, the first firm shares confidences naturally, which vio- 
lates no ethical rule against the disclosure of confidences. The 
Model Rules make the sharing presumption in the first firm re- 
buttable. In contrast, second firm confidence sharing can only 
occur when the lawyers in the firm know that the opponent is 
their new lawyer's former client and that sharing the confi- 
dences would constitute a violation of the ethical rule against 
disclosure. The Model Rules make the sharing presumption in 
the second firm irrebuttable. The difference in rebuttability 
must, therefore, rest on an assumption of unethical conduct in 
the second firm, a strange foundation for a rule of ethics. 
Finally, as a rule, the screening solution to the former gov- 
ernment lawyer successive conflict makes little sense. It does 
not prevent an intentional violation of a nondisclosure rule. It 
constitutes merely an affectation regarding proof and an indul- 
gence of the courts' presumed ability to ensure against disclo- 
sure by examining law firm procedures. As an ethical matter, 
however, screens are not just ineffectual, they are offensive. 
The need to screen, considered from an ethical perspective, 
must presume that the former government lawyer will not ad- 
here to the ethical rules against disclosure of confidences-an 
unattractive foundation for any ethical precept. 
Courts have based their concern for successive conflict on a 
concern for confidentiality. Even if that concern for confidenti- 
ality justifies an adversary system rule against successive con- 
flict, it might not justify a similar ethical rule for the 
profession. The profession has no ethical interest in the utilita- 
rian theory emphasizing client freedom of apprehension, 
though it may have an interest, as a profession, in being the re- 
pository of society's secrets. If the profession has a legitimate 
ethical interest in its status as secret-keeper, however, the 
Model Code and the Model Rules can fully vindicate it without 
a successive conflict rule. If anything, a rule against successive 
conflict implies that the primary ethical prohibition against the 
use or disclosure of confidential information does not keep law- 
yers' lips sealed. Even for ethics with a disciplinaiy agenda, a 
successive conflict rule provides no remedy or assurance not al- 
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ready obtainable through the primary confidential information 
rule. While a court disqualification may create a prophylactic 
against breach of the confidential information rule, another 
ethical rule protecting confidences by prohibiting subsequent 
representation against a former client merely provides a choice 
of bases for the disciplinary action. 
Rather than protecting confidences, a concern for loyalty 
and the appearance of professional propriety present better rea- 
sons for ethically prohibiting subsequent representation against 
a former client. While the characterization of the representa- 
tion as subsequent made loyalty anomalous in the adversary 
system context,lg7 it does not necessarily do so in the context of 
ethics. Leaving aside the wisdom of doing so, the profession 
might well determine that from the lawyer's perspective, an at- 
torney-client relationship lasts forever. Consistent with the 
proper perspective for ethical issues, the profession might insist 
that no ethical lawyer undertake representation against some- 
one with whom the lawyer has had an attorney-client relation- 
ship regardless of whether confidential information existed. 
The profession also could, as a matter of valid ethics, hold that 
the appearance of that continuing relationship is important to 
public acceptance of the profession. The same analysis might 
reasonably lead to an ethical rule prohibiting subsequent repre- 
sentation against a client unless that client first chooses an- 
other lawyer. 
The Model Rule's use of the substantial relationship dis- 
tinction to determine the circumstances under which an attor- 
ney-client relationship lasts forever makes no sense under 
either the loyalty or appearance of impropriety analyses. 
Neither loyalty nor the appearance of loyalty have anything to 
do with confidential information, the sine qua non of the sub- 
stantial relationship test. The reasons for the hypothetical ethi- 
cal rule that clients last forever do not relate to the nature of 
the representation and do not depend on the existence of confi- 
dential information. The original Canon 6 provided a poor basis 
for legal rules and, by tying the idea to confidences, for an eth- 
ics precept as well. It was, however, an acceptable judgment 
about how the profession wanted its members to be, or at least 
appear to be. 
Although the loyalty and appearance of loyalty theories 
are consistent with the perspective the profession should em- 
ploy in promulgating ethics, the profession should avoid an eth- 
197. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text. 
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ical judgment that attorney-client relationships last forever. 
Neither clients nor lawyers believe that such relationships do, 
or should, last forever. A rule against successive conflict thus 
embodies an assumption the public does not accept and ad- 
dresses a problem the profession does not have. Similarly, the 
vision of the attorney-client relationship as a lifelong counselor 
and friend relationship exists only in a decreasing number of 
situations. The result of unique personal circumstances, those 
situations need no rules of ethics to maintain them. Moreover, 
the profession cannot, in a less personal world of megafirms 
and megaclients, convince those clients that they will forever 
need the same lawyer if the lifelong counselor and friend rela- 
tionship does not develop naturally. Further, nothing suggests 
that the profession needs to increase the faith of individual cli- 
ents in individual lawyers by assuring the client that the rela- 
tionship will last forever. Clients do not use lawyers less nor 
does the surrogate system of dispute resolution, upon which 
lawyers rely for their existence, appear threatened by a lack of 
faith in lawyer constancy. Quite the contrary, the public uses 
and despises lawyers more today than at almost any time in his- 
and neither the use nor the despising relates to a failure 
of constancy.199 While the profession's desire to be loved pro- 
vides a proper perspective from which to create an ethical rule, 
a successive conflict rule contains little that is likely to add to 
the public's reverence for lawyers. 
Finally, if courts use the adversary system rule analysis 
this Article suggests, the profession should reject any ethical 
prohibition on subsequent representation, so that the profes- 
sion's ethics will not prohibit what the adversary system per- 
mits. A difference between court rules and the profession's 
ethics, without more, does not provide sufficient reason to re- 
ject a rule with a sound ethical foundation. The question, how- 
ever, is whether such a rule can survive both the courts' and 
the disciplinary system's failure to enforce it. A lawyer- 
operated disciplinary system will not likely punish an activity 
that courts have approved, particularly when the so-called un- 
ethical conduct vindicates the client's right to counsel of choice, 
a substantial value among lawyers. The result may be an ethi- 
cal rule that is ridiculed because no one enforces it. 
198. For a cogent discussion of why the role of the lawyer ensures a socie- 
tal mistrust that grows with familiarity, see Post, supra note 187. 
199. See Kaplan, The NUPol l  Results: Take Heed, Lawyers, Nat'l L.J., Au- 
gust 18, 1986, at S-3, col. 1 (survey indicating public already views lawyers as 
loyal to clients, possibly to a fault). 
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There are contrary arguments. Professional disciplinary 
committees might try to enforce a successive conflict rule re- 
gardless of courts' attitudes200 Even if disciplinary committees 
do not sanction violations of the rule, peer pressure for the rule 
within the profession may reduce substantially the incidence of 
subsequent adverse representation. Additionally, an ethical 
rule without enforcement is not necessarily a rule without good 
purpose. In a world in which economic and personal reality, 
rather than court or disciplinary rules, make, break, and con- 
trol attorney-client relationships, an ethical rule against succes- 
sive conflict may weigh on the side of adherence and thereby 
benefit both the lawyer and the lawyer's clients. 
E. REMEDIES TO FIT THE PROBLEM 
The dispute resolution system traditionally has limited 
lawyer disqualification to true concurrent conflict of interest 
situations, thus vindicating the system's foundation of truth 
through adversary representation. Subsequent representation 
against a former client does not present a conflict of interest. 
Despite the early cases' reliance on conflict of interest decisions 
and language about 10yalty,~Ol courts have recognized and occa- 
sionally admitted that the subsequent representation concern 
derives from courts' concern for confidential information.202 
Although the lawyer's obligation not to use or disclose con- 
fidential information restricts what the lawyer may use on be- 
half of the present client, the obligation does not create a 
conflict of interest. Many rules restrict what a lawyer may do 
or use on behalf of a client. For example, a lawyer may not 
wiretap, steal documents, pay witnesses, depose the other party 
outside of the presence of counsel, or do a host of other things 
that might help the lawyer prepare and the client prevail. All 
of these restrictions limit how the lawyer may gain information 
for use in the representation and none present a conflict of in- 
terest. The rule that prohibits using a former client's confiden- 
tial information simply constitutes another restriction on how 
the lawyer may gather information to help the current client. 
200. Whether a state disciplinary system could penalize lawyer conduct 
that a federal court specifically allowed raises an interesting supremacy ques- 
tion beyond the scope of this Article. It is fair, however, to assume that until 
the practice rises to a level at which there is a genuine threat to the adminis- 
tration of the federal courts, the question will never be raised, let alone 
answered. 
201. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. 
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For example, the risk that a lawyer will use confidential infor- 
mation may exceed the risk that she will steal documents, but , 
the nature of the prohibition is the same. 
Confidential information differs from the other improper 
information sources only because the lawyer already has the 
confidential information. The possession of the confidence may 
cause the lawyer to be overly cautious in the use of the same 
information developed independently in a subsequent represen- 
tation. Such a situation presents a classic conflict. The possible 
reduction in a lawyer's vigor in the current matter, however, 
does not produce a conflict of interest that justifies 
disqualification. 
The client affected adversely by the conflict, the current 
client, does not want disqualification. Professor Morgan con- 
tends that the Model Rules do not deal effectively with the is- 
sue of remedy in the imputed disqualification area and that 
different rules may require different remedies.203 Although he 
was considering Rules 1.10 and 1.11 from a different perspec- 
tive, his suggestion that a party should not be allowed to seek 
disqualification in pursuit of another's interest is useful here.204 
The former client has no standing to complain that the lawyer's 
possession of the former client's confidences may restrict the 
vigor of the lawyer's representation of the current client. 
Similarly, courts have no independent interest sufficient to 
give them standing to disqualify an unwilling client's lawyer. 
To decide that the adversary system has standing to disqualify 
the current client's lawyer in pursuit of the current client's 
right to effective representation would be unreasonably pater- 
nalistic. The disqualification remedy intrudes unjustifiably into 
the current client's legitimate area of influence. 
Courts do have an interest in vigorous advocacy, however, 
for which an appropriate remedy might be fashioned. They 
might determine that the adversary assumption of the dispute 
resolution system depends on every client knowing about fac- 
tors that might inhibit counsel's representation. Accordingly, 
courts could require a lawyer beginning a subsequent represen- 
tation against a former client to file a written consultation and 
consent form between the lawyer and the current client. 
203. See Morgan, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Client in  the Model 
Rules of Professiod Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 993,1001. Professor 
Morgan also argues for a reasonable relationship between problem and rem- 
edy. Id. 
204. Id. at 1002 n.3. 
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Although the consent form should not dictate the counsel deci- 
sion for the party disadvantaged by the lawyer's possession of 
confidential information, it would affect it. By formalizing the 
conference between the handicapped lawyer and the prospec- 
tive client, courts would increase the chance that the client will 
be fully informed when the decision is made. Further, the con- 
sultation and consent form would provide a document from 
which the court could make its own determination about 
whether the client has enough information for an informed 
judgment. The court might, consistent with its concern for the 
current client's level of information, hold a hearing to explain 
to the client the potential problems created by the lawyer's pos- 
session of confidential information. These suggestions would 
reduce subsequent representation against former clients for the 
right reason: a more informed current client wishes to avoid a 
lawyer who may not be able to provide full, vigorous represen- 
tation. In any event, the court will have fulfilled any true con- 
flict of interest obligation that it might have. 
Although the court has no adversary system interest in the 
successive conflict beyond the informed decision of the current 
client, the profession has an ethics interest if lawyers use or 
disclose confidential information. That interest is identical to 
the profession's concern for any other breach of confidential in- 
formation. If the profession considers the keeping of confi- 
dences critical, it has a precise mechanism-disciplinary 
action-for vindicating that interest. The profession can have 
greater influence on lawyer behavior through strong discipli- 
nary action against lawyers who actually breach confidences 
during a subsequent representation than courts can have 
through the possibility of disqualification. Moreover, discipli- 
nary action punishes the lawyer rather than the client. In addi- 
tion, the use of strong disciplinary action should induce other 
lawyers to avoid the risk of discipline by avoiding successive 
conflict or by being extremely solicitous of confidences in sub- 
sequent  representation^.^^^ 
F. A BETTER MODEL FOR THE RULES 
Regardless of whether courts choose to eliminate succes- 
sive conflict disqualification, the profession should modify its 
205. The disciplinary action has the added advantage of occurring after the 
completion of the subsequent representation and is premised on the actual 
breach of the confidence. It avoids the problem of having to examine, without 
disclosing, a confidence about which the former client is protective. 
Heinonline - -  72 Minn. L. Rev. 286 1987-1988 
19871 SUCCESSWE CONFLICT DISQUALIFICATION 287 
ethical rules. The profession adopted the present rules as if it 
were a court. All of the previous arguments that apply to 
courts thus apply to the profession when it adopts the courts' 
role.206 As Professor Morgan has noted, the argument that eth- 
ics rules are irrelevant to court determinations outside of disci- 
plinary matters is "nonsense."207 The Model Rules are of 
heightened importance in the successive conflict area. Because 
the Supreme Court's decision barring interlocutory appeals has 
effectively disenfranchised appellate courts in the attorney dis- 
qualification area, the Model Rules are the only likely univer- 
sal statement for the near future. If the profession withdraws 
the Model Rules, which mimic the Second Circuit decisions, 
courts will have to look elsewhere for authority. If the profes- 
sion decides its ethics should be rules, it should promulgate rea- 
soned rules. 
Both reasonable rules for courts and better ethics for the 
profession require withdrawal of the provisions in Rules 1.9(a), 
representation against a former client, 1.10(b) and l.lO(c), im- 
puted disqualification in successive conflict situations, and 1.11, 
former government lawyers. Withdrawal of those provisions 
avoids describing and enforcing a fictional, everlasting attorney- 
client relationship and provides better meaning to conflict of 
interest by reserving that term for the serious problem of con- 
current conflict. 
The profession should move Rule 1.9(b), which concerns 
the use of confidential information, to Rule 1.6, the confidenti- 
ality of information rule, where it belongs. The rule against the 
use of confidential information is as important as the rule 
against disclosure of that information. Placing all confidential 
information provisions in one rule and withdrawing rules that 
assume lawyers will violate prohibitions against use and disclo- 
sure of confidential information avoids the anomaly of ethical 
tenets based on presumed unethical behavior. 
Rule 1.7, concerning conflict of interest, should contain 
either another section or an expanded comment to Rule 1.7(b) 
to address the potential conflict of interest problem when a 
lawyer contemplates representing a party against a former cli- 
ent. It should require written disclosure by the lawyer to the 
client of the nature of the lawyer's "responsibilities to . . . a 
third person."208 The disclosure should describe the previous 
206. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. 
207. Morgan, supra note 203, at 1001. 
208. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1984). 
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representation of the potentially adverse party and the possible 
restrictions that former representation imposes on the contem- 
plated current employment. The disclosure should be suffi- 
ciently precise to convey the problem but sufficiently general to 
avoid disclosing the former client's confidences. The modified 
rule also should require written consent from the current 
client. 
This Article's proposals would take the successive conflict 
problem, insofar as it is claimed on behalf of a former client, 
completely out of the area of ethics. Although adoption of the 
Article's proposals would have a significant beneficial effect on 
courts, the effect on the profession's view of itself and its cli- 
ents may, in the long run, be more important. The end of suc- 
cessive conflict will hasten the day when lawyers and clients 
admit that an attorney-client relationship does not last forever. 
If the profession determines, however, that clients should last 
forever, the profession should nevertheless withdraw the tangle 
of substantial relationship and imputed disqualification rules 
and replace them with a one-line admonition: "No lawyer shall 
oppose a client or a former client in any matter." 
CONCLUSION 
More than thirty years ago, courts seized on a poor notion 
about ethics to create a bad rule about successive conflict. 
Although it took the creation of large firms and the imputed 
disqualification of associates to demonstrate the doctrinal flaw 
in the original successive conflict rule, it is now clear that the 
rule has caused great, unanticipated mischief in pursuit of an 
inappropriate value. The current abuse of the successive con- 
flict disqualification doctrine should lead courts and the profes- 
sion to reevaluate and eliminate the doctrine. They should, at 
the same time, reconsider their proper roles in defining how 
lawyers should be and how they should act, with a full under- 
standing of the potential for doctrinal mischief and role dirni- 
nution if they adopt perspectives beyond their appropriate 
jurisdictions. 
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